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Executive Summary
1. Objective, context and 
methodology  
OBJECTIVE: This report presents the results of 
the evaluation of the European Community’s 
support to private sector development (PSD) in 
third countries over the period 1994-2003. It aims 
to contribute to improving the coherence of the 
Commission’s sectoral approach and also at 
enhancing coherence between PSD support 
objectives and the Commission’s other policy 
objectives. 
 
CONTEXT: Based on the wide consensus that 
private sector enterprises make an important 
contribution to economic growth and to helping 
fight poverty, international economic institutions 
have widely confirmed the importance of 
supporting private sector development. 
 
Over time, and in particular during the last decade, 
the Commission has developed various 
co-operation instruments for the sector. Yet no 
global evaluation of Commission support to 
private sector development has been undertaken.  
This evaluation reflects the commitment of the 
Commission to reinforcing its support to the 
business sector of third countries. 
 
METHODOLOGY: The evaluation was carried out 
in two separate phases. First, the Desk Phase 
involved an analysis of documents collected in 
Brussels, interviews with Commission officials and 
a questionnaire sent to a sample of 25 Delegations. 
Second, the Field and Synthesis Phase of the 
evaluation entailed testing the hypotheses 
proposed during the Desk Phase though five 
country studies. In addition, during that phase a 
survey was carried out to explore the views and 
understanding of Delegations on the PSD 
Thematic Network as well as to assess their needs 
in terms of support from HQ. The team integrated 
these new findings with those from the Desk 
Phase and analysed this information base to arrive 
at an overall assessment of EC support for private 
sector development in third countries. 
2. Findings and Analysis 
Four evaluation criteria and three horizontal 
themes were analysed: Relevance of the EC PSD 
strategy; its effectiveness; its sustainability; the efficiency 
of EC PSD intervention; the coherence between EC 
PSD strategy and other European policies; and the 
extent to which donor coordination, on the one hand, 
and crosscutting issues, on the other, have been taken 
into account. 
 
RELEVANCE: The EC PSD strategy consists of 
five areas of intervention in support of private 
sector development. These areas cover what is 
considered to be a comprehensive strategy for 
support to PSD. However, the strategy does not 
sufficiently explain the way in which interventions 
in these areas can contribute to enhancing business 
sector competitiveness.1 It is not sufficiently clear 
either on the mechanisms through which higher 
competitiveness can contribute to co-operation 
and development objectives. As a consequence, 
implementation of the strategy in the field is 
uneven: the basis for a decision to intervene in one 
area in one specific country is by no means always 
clear and, even more, the specific objectives of 
EC-supported PSD programmes at country level 
do not always correspond to the requirements of 
the strategy. 
 
EFFECTIVENESS: Overall, the effectiveness of EC 
PSD interventions depends on a series of recurring 
factors which, however, were not systematically 
taken into consideration, thereby limiting the 
interventions’ effectiveness: when selecting an area 
of intervention, the lack of detailed analysis often 
led to ad hoc area selection; during programme 
design there was often a misalignment between 
programme-specific objective and those laid down 
in the EC PSD strategy,  a lack of correspondence 
between programme components and real 
obstacles to development, limited outreach to and 
non-strategic selection of beneficiaries, and a lack 
                                                 
1  ‘Business sector’ is defined as including private and 
public owned enterprises operating under market 
conditions. The common expression ‘Private Sector 
Development’ covers in fact the development of the 
business sector. 
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of building on past experience. It was observed 
that during programme implementation not all 
planned activities were carried out. Finally, there is 
an inadequate monitoring and evaluation system, 
with indicators too often focused on outputs 
rather than impacts. 
 
SUSTAINABILITY: The analysis of sustainability of 
PSD interventions takes into account the 
sustainability of the benefits produced by the project 
and, when appropriate, sustainability of the activities 
proposed. Despite the lack of information on 
sustainability, the following elements could be 
highlighted. First, an environment conductive to 
PSD is a basic condition for the sustainability of all 
PSD interventions. Second, sustainability seems 
more likely when PSD interventions are linked to 
institutional development or when they contribute 
to improving private sector practices or 
competences. Third, sustainability of interventions 
in the business environment, as well as of 
interventions providing direct support for 
companies, depends on government’s ownership, 
particularly its capacity to own a process at the end 
of an intervention. Finally, interventions are less 
likely to be sustainable when they offer direct 
support to private sector operations without 
generating a substantial change in behaviour, 
practice or knowledge.  
 
EFFICIENCY: As with other sectors of EC 
co-operation, two key factors inhibiting the 
efficiency of many EC programmes are the 
complexity of EC procedures and the delays 
incurred at different stages of the programme 
cycle. On the other hand deconcentration seems to 
have enhanced the efficiency of EC operations 
(quicker decision-making, better identification of 
needs and possible lower cost), but has also 
brought with it some concerns: (i) strategic aspects 
are not yet sufficiently taken into account because 
Delegation staff are overloaded with operational 
tasks or are not sufficiently prepared for these new 
responsibilities and (ii) sharing of experience may 
become even more difficult than in the past. 
 
COHERENCE: With regards to coherence with 
other European policies and strategies, EC PSD 
policy documents do not analyse how other 
European policies or strategies can affect, 
positively or negatively, Community support to 
private sector development in third countries, the 
objective of which is to enhance the business 
sector’s competitiveness in local and international 
markets. Likewise, very few CSPs analyse the 
coherence of Community support with European 
policies, and PSD programme documents seldom 
if ever address the issue. Moreover, such aspects, 
although central to an appreciation of the 
programme’s impact, are not covered by follow-
up, monitoring or evaluation procedures and 
reporting. Neither is coherence with EC support 
to other sectors in third countries adequately 
ensured. Yet trade, regional integration and 
macroeconomic support are three increasingly 
important areas of co-operation for the EC, all of 
which have immediate implications for PSD. 
 
DONOR COORDINATION: Donor coordination at 
central level is ensured by the Commission 
Services and shared via the Thematic PSD 
Network. At country level the effectiveness of 
coordination practices has recently improved 
although it is still quite varied. Sharing of 
information between donors and with the 
government has improved significantly but so far 
few joint activities or projects have been 
undertaken. Furthermore, the risk of overlap was 
found to be important, especially for meso- and 
micro-level interventions. It is in this type of 
intervention that effective coordination is 
sometimes hampered by national interests. In spite 
of this, donor coordination is possible in specific 
areas of intervention where conflicts of interest are 
less in evidence (e.g. legal and regulatory 
framework, institutional capacity and policy 
dialogue) as well as in those instances where the 
potential for coordination across areas of 
intervention is high, such as local economic 
development.  
 
CROSSCUTTING ISSUES: Four crosscutting issues 
are analysed: gender; environment; social issues 
such as working conditions or child labour; and 
good governance. Although most country 
programming documents explicitly mention 
crosscutting issues, they do not give directions for 
systematic integration of these issues into the co-
operation strategy and in particular into the PSD 
strategy. Further, they seldom provide monitoring 
indicators and baseline information. In addition, 
the evaluators did not find evidence of any 
systematic attempt at concretely integrating CCI 
into EC PSD interventions.  
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3. Conclusions 
3.1 Overall assessment 
Much progress can be noted through the period of 
evaluation on the understanding of the key role of 
the private sector on development. This evolution 
is reflected on different orientation documents and 
a milestone is the strategy proposed through the 
COM(2003)267. This strategy also reflects efforts 
made to provide Community PSD support in a 
comprehensive and coherent way to all third 
countries. 
 
Whilst the strategy is comprehensive at covering 
most dimensions of PSD, one major weakness is 
the ambiguity on the message conveyed. For 
instance, it mentions that a particular attention 
should be given to macro-level interventions but it 
also leaves much room for micro-level 
programmes that can crowd-out private initiate or 
introduce market distortions. This ambiguity is 
reinforced by a second weakness; the fact that little 
orientation is given to prioritise among the areas of 
intervention proposed. Given the transversal 
dimension of the private sector, this means that 
the strategy is too open, scattering EC efforts 
among all sorts of programmes in different areas, 
with different focuses and with different degrees 
of success. A second consequence of these two 
limitations, a majority of the EC staff responsible 
for implementing Community support to PSD 
lacks the necessary strategic vision on how to 
support PSD, with direct consequences on the 
implementation: uneven implementation in the 
field and a limited contribution to the 
competitiveness of the private sector in beneficiary 
countries - even for more recent programmes. 
3.2 Community PSD Strategy 
In terms of progress achieved, there is first an 
increased awareness of the importance of PSD 
for third countries (CS-1), as the private sector is 
now accepted by the EC as a critical factor in 
poverty reduction. This awareness is reflected in 
the drawing up of a single strategy for all third 
countries (CS-2). Also reflecting the importance 
given to PSD support is the creation of an 
informal Thematic Network (CS-3) for PSD at 
HQ level, as well as improved donor 
coordination (CS-4), in spite of the fact that the 
latter is particularly demanding in the area of PSD 
support. 
 
Beyond this positive progress, certain challenges lie 
ahead. First, the strategy still conveys an 
ambiguous message (CS-5) on the way in which 
the State and the Community should support PSD, 
which has direct consequences for how the 
strategy can be disseminated, understood and used 
by the staff. In addition, the strategy does not 
prioritise between the 5 different areas of 
intervention proposed (CS-6) and no guidelines 
or criteria have been laid down to help staff select 
the right area for a given situation. As a 
consequence, in most cases staff decide on the 
basis of personal preferences, past programmes or 
beneficiaries’ requests. Furthermore, the EC PSD 
strategy has not been sufficiently disseminated 
(CS-7) and thus appropriated by the staff, with the 
consequence that the strategy remains largely 
unknown to a majority of EC staff. The 
ambiguous message of the strategy and the 
subsequent difficulties of disseminating it among 
the staff resulted in a lack of strategic vision 
among the staff (CS-8), which leads to uneven 
implementation of the strategy (CS-9). 
3.3 Implementation of PSD support 
A) ACROSS AREA OF INTERVENTION 
 
CI-1: When programming a country PSD strategy, 
the absence of a methodical process for 
selecting an area of intervention limits the 
effectiveness of interventions. For a given area 
of intervention, the degree of effectiveness in 
improving business sector competitiveness will 
vary depending on a number of factors, including 
the degree of priority attached to this area in that 
country, the comparative advantage of the EC in 
that area and the preconditions that need to be met 
before intervening. The EC does not systematically 
assess these factors, let alone take them into 
account when selecting its areas of intervention in 
a given country. 
 
CI-2: PSD activities are not designed so as to 
improve the competitiveness of the private 
sector in a sustainable manner. 
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During programme design PSD activities do not 
sufficiently take into consideration certain factors 
that affect the extent to which EC programmes 
improve the competitiveness of the private sector 
in a significant and sustainable way. First, 
programme objectives are not systematically geared 
towards achieving the objectives stipulated in the 
EC PSD strategy. Second, key constraints bearing 
on success are not sufficiently addressed. Third, 
most meso- and micro-activities lack sufficient 
outreach and are not targeted on the most 
adequate beneficiaries. Finally, lessons from the 
past are inadequately taken into account. 
 
CI-3: There is no systematic attempt to 
maximize complementarities between areas of 
intervention or to ensure coherence between 
PSD and other sectors or other EU policies. 
First, complementarities between areas of 
intervention are seldom exploited. Second, 
coordination between PSD interventions and 
interventions in other sectors - including trade, 
regional integration and macroeconomic support - 
is limited. Third, while the risk of incoherence is 
even greater with respect to other EU policies, 
little is done to ensure that EU policies take into 
account development objectives as required by the 
Treaty. 
 
B) BY AREA OF INTERVENTION 
 
1) BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT: Many EC 
business environment programmes have been 
successful, in large part due to their high 
relevance (CI-4). However, while it is a key pre-
condition for successful implementation of macro-
level programmes, strong political involvement 
of partner governments is not systematically 
ensured (CI-5). That said, some EC practices 
have positively influenced government 
involvement (CI-6), for example through 
minimising delays, consulting all relevant 
stakeholders, entering into joint implementation 
with other donors and proposing reforms at 
provincial rather than central level when 
applicable. Furthermore, support to intermediary 
organizations has been an effective way of 
influencing government policies (CI-7). 
2) FINANCIAL SECTOR: Most meso- and 
micro-level EC interventions in the financial sector 
were unsuccessful at addressing the obstacles 
to access to finance (CI-8). Similarly, 
programmes aimed at financing specific 
investment projects through direct capital 
contribution have usually been successful in 
delivering expected outputs but unsuccessful 
with regards to the objectives of the EC PSD 
strategy (CI-9). Finally, the PSD Guidelines are 
not sufficiently clear regarding the role of the 
Commission in interventions in the financial 
sector (CI-10).  
 
3) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SERVICES: By 
focusing on direct delivery of BDS, not all 
programmes aimed at reinforcing local BDS 
markets (CI-11) and, as a result, these 
programmes did not succeed in meeting the 
criteria of outreach and sustainability. The 
misalignment of the objectives of EC programmes 
with those proposed by the Blue Book results 
partly from the fact that the EC strategy is not 
totally aligned with the Blue Book BDS 
paradigm (CI-12). Despite the positive evolution 
towards a greater focus on reinforcing local BDS 
markets, EC programmes do not adequately 
address the failures of such markets (CI-13) 
and in consequence have been unsuccessful in 
reinforcing local BDS markets. Two factors help 
explain the inadequacy of EC solutions to existing 
market failures: first, the EC neither assesses 
market failures sufficiently nor devises 
adequate supply-side solutions (CI-14). Some 
BDS programmes have successfully achieved 
their specific objectives, conditioned however on 
the problem of outreach (CI-15). 
 
4) INVESTMENT AND INTER-BUSINESS CO-
OPERATION PROMOTION: Partnership interven-
tions have been effective under regional and 
national programmes (CI-16). 
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4. Recommendations 
4.1 Community PSD strategy 
First of all, it is important to clarify the message 
conveyed by the strategy on the role that the EC, 
as development agency, should play in terms of 
PSD. Further, it should be made clear why and 
how the EC can and should support PSD with 
a view to contributing to wider development 
and co-operation objectives (RS-1). 
 
In addition, the strategy should prioritise the 
various areas of intervention (RS-2): priority 
should be given to interventions at macro-level, 
while interventions at micro-level should be treated 
only as complementary and implemented only 
when the business environment is considered 
adequate. 
 
Third, there is a need to increase ownership of 
the strategy with a view to reaching a unique 
and common Community vision on PSD 
support (RS-3) through wide dissemination using 
all available channels. Fourth, when updating the 
COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines, their different 
functions should be kept in mind (RS-4): a 
communication should define theoretical aspects 
and give policy guidance; the Guidelines should be 
seen as operational support. Finally, PSD aid 
effectiveness can be increased through the sharing 
of experience, both between the different actors 
involved in EC PSD support and between third 
countries, by building on the Thematic 
Network (RS-5). 
4.2 Implementation of PSD support 
A) ACROSS AREAS OF INTERVENTIONS 
 
First, despite the fact that there is no one-size-fits 
all approach to PSD interventions, it is important 
to adopt a methodical procedure for selecting 
areas of intervention in a given country (RI-1). 
This should at least include: a critical assessment of 
the priority areas of interventions; selecting an area 
in which the EC has a comparative advantage 
(interventions in the business environment should 
be encouraged but micro- and some meso- level 
interventions in the financial sector avoided); and 
an assessement of whether the pre-conditions for 
intervening in a given area have been met. Second, 
design PSD programmes with a view to 
improving business sector competitiveness in 
a sustainable manner (RI-2), which involves 
aligning programme objectives with those 
stipulated in the EC PSD strategy and addressing 
the key constraints bearing on success in the areas 
of intervention. Third, maximize complement-
tarities between areas of intervention, as well 
as coherence between PSD interventions, inter-
ventions in other sectors, and other EU policies 
(RI-3). 
 
B) BY AREA OF INTERVENTION 
 
1) BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT: Interventions 
aiming to improve the business environment 
should be encouraged, as long as there is 
sufficient government commitment (RI-4). This 
decision should involve an assessment of the level 
of government involvement and well as a 
maximization of involvement through several 
possible channels of action. Second, encourage 
support to intermediary organizations as a way 
of influencing private sector policies (RI-5), by 
following a set of best practices. 
 
2) FINANCIAL SERVICES: Avoid meso- and 
micro-level interventions aimed at intervening 
in financial markets, unless in co-operation with 
other financial institutions (RI-6). In addition, PSD 
Guidelines should leave no ambiguity regarding 
the role of the EC in financial market 
interventions (RI-7); clarifying the Guidelines on 
the role of the Commission, on the one side, and 
the EIB and the EBRD, on the other. 
 
3) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SERVICES: BDS 
programmes should aim at reinforcing local 
BDS markets and not at the direct delivery of 
services (RI-8). Moreover, those programmes 
should address prevailing BDS market failures 
rather than advocate demand-led subsidies by 
default (RI-9). The latter requires an assessment of 
the local BDS market and of the exact reasons for 
market failures; use of supply-side measures 
whenever necessary; flexible programme design; an 
adequate balance between international and local 
consultants; and an avoidance of programmes with 
only limited potential impact on the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Mandate and purpose 
The 2003 evaluation plan of the EuropeAid Co-operation Office provided for the 
Evaluation Unit to undertake an evaluation of European Community Support to Private 
Sector Development in third countries. 
 
As stated in the Terms of Reference, the objective of the evaluation is to contribute to 
improving the coherence of the Commission’s sectoral approach through an assessment of 
the Commission’s co-operation activities in Private Sector Development (PSD) in the 
context of the objectives of the various national and regional co-operation and 
development programmes. It also addresses the need for enhanced coherence between the 
objectives of private sector development support and the Commission’s other policy 
objectives. 
1.2 Results and users 
The main output of this study is an ex post evaluation of the Commission’s strategy and 
actions in support of PSD over the period 1994-2003 through an assessment of the key 
issues reflected in the Evaluation Questions. The evaluation provides an assessment of the 
steps taken by the Commission to improve the relevance and coherence of programming, 
targeting and the instruments chosen. 
 
The final report gives an overall judgement on fundamental aspects of the Commission’s 
past performance and on the relevance of its proposed approach. The evaluation should 
serve policy-making, sectoral decision-making and project management purposes both for 
the Commission Services and for governmental and civil society partners. 
1.3 Phases of the evaluation 
The evaluation has been carried out under two contracts. Between October 2003 and June 
2004, a Desk Evaluation of ‘European Community Support to Private Sector 
Development in Third Countries’ over the period 1994-2003 was carried out. This desk 
evaluation was based on an analysis of documents collected in Brussels and was 
complemented by interviews with Commission officials and a questionnaire sent to a 
sample of Delegations. The evaluation’s Final Report (June 2004) included a set of 
Evaluation Questions (EQs), findings in relation to each of these EQ, a thorough analysis 
of the evidence and preliminary conclusions and recommendations. 
 
The desk approach on its own had certain limitations: strategic and policy aspects could be 
well enough covered through documentation analysis and interviews in Brussels, but more 
specific aspects regarding implementation and impact of projects and programmes were 
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difficult to assess without field missions. For this reason, the Evaluation Unit requested 
ADE to complement the Desk Evaluation with a Field and Synthesis Phase. 
 
The aim of the second phase was: to search for new information; verify working 
hypotheses; and to test, refine and possibly complement the preliminary analysis, findings, 
conclusions and recommendations arrived at during the Desk Evaluation by carrying out 
an analysis of PSD support in five countries (Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Vietnam and 
Zambia). Furthermore, given the key role that the PSD Thematic Network can play on EC 
support to PSD, it was agreed to carry out a survey focusing on the exchange of 
information and tools between Headquarters and Delegations. This Field and Synthesis 
Phase was carried out between October 2004 and July 2005. 
1.4 Structure of Report 
The report is organised as follows: 
Section 2 presents the main findings on EU regional co-operation policy; the 
Commission’s strategy for support to private sector development in third countries as well 
as the implementation of EC interventions in support of private sector development in the 
different co-operation programmes. This Section is complemented by Annexes 5 to 10 
where the information collected during the different phases of the evaluation is presented. 
To help the reader, the substantial information base used for this evaluation is described 
and presented not in the main report but in the annexes. 
Section 3 contains an analysis, based on the evidence presented in Section 2 and in 
Annexes 5 to 10, of the Commission’s strategy and interventions in support of private 
sector development over the past decade, according to four evaluation criteria and three 
horizontal themes: relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, efficiency, coherence, 
coordination, and crosscutting issues such as gender, environment and good governance. 
Section 4 presents the main conclusions and an overall assessment of past Community 
support to PSD based on the analysis section. 
Section 5, finally, presents the main recommendations deriving from the conclusions. 
The annexes are organized as follows: 
Annex 1 presents the Terms of References for Phases I and II. 
Annex 2 contains the bibliography used during the evaluation2. 
Annex 3 contains a list of people met during the evaluation. 
Annex 4 covers the methodological aspects of the evaluation with a view to explaining the 
processes, methods and tools used to conduct the evaluation; it is both descriptive and 
normative, thus providing both an overview and an assessment of the methodological 
approach used in the evaluation. 
Annex 5, as mentioned above, contains all the information collected during the different 
phases of the evaluation and which constitutes the basis of the analysis. 
Annexes 6 to 10 present Country Notes with information specific to the country cases. 
 
                                                 
2  The bibliography specific to country missions is included in each of the Country Notes (Annexes 6 to 10). 
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2. Findings 
This section presents the main factual elements collected by the evaluation team through 
the analysis of documents, interviews in Brussels, the survey and five country missions. 
They are organised and presented as follows: first, a brief summary of the European 
Union’s co-operation policy with third countries or regions3 which provides the objectives to 
which PSD support must contribute; second, the Commission’s strategy for supporting the 
development of the private sector in third countries and how this strategy relates to the overall co-
operation policy of the EU; third, information on the implementation of EC interventions 
in support of private sector development in the different co-operation programmes. 
2.1 Brief summary of EU development and co-operation policy 
The European Union maintains co-operation relations with different regions and countries 
around the world. This evaluation concentrates on co-operation with the developing 
countries, countries in transition or reconstruction, the so-called “emerging economies” 
and Mexico4. These countries have different levels of socio-economic development and 
play distinct geopolitical roles. Therefore, co-operation with each of them differs 
substantially, particularly in terms of the objectives of co-operation and the prioritisation 
of funds allocated. Co-operation with groups of countries is often framed under specific 
co-operation agreements with an internal European legal basis. The five co-operation 
programmes considered for this evaluation are: ACP, ALA, MEDA, TACIS and CARDS5. 
 
ACP countries are the main beneficiaries of EU aid and the EU is also their largest 
investor. Moreover, the ACP group contains the largest proportion of the least developed 
countries in the world, most of which are very small economies with poor links to the 
world economy, and among the last to face the challenges of globalisation. The historical 
relations between the ACP countries and the EU, from the Yaoundé Conventions to the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, have evolved towards a clear link between development 
support and a policy framework favourable to trade and development. The focus is on 
removal of barriers to trade, regional co-operation and on enhancing all trade-related 
co-operation areas. 
 
While EU relations with the ACPs have been established with poverty reduction as their main 
objective, regions that include countries on average more developed than the ACP 
countries tend to have relations with the EU directed towards a “partnership” in which 
mutual economic interest is an essential element of the relationship. The “partnership” 
approach has been developed in EU co-operation with the ALA and MED countries in 
particular. 
                                                 
3  The sub-section is largely drawn from “Clarifying the definitions of EC economic co-operation with third countries”, 
EC-ADE, 2002. 
4  This definition of “third countries” is based on the COM(2003)267 on PSD support. 
5  For a more complete bibliography, see “Clarifying the definitions of EC economic co-operation with third 
countries”, EC-ADE, 2002. 
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In Asia and Latin America (ALA), partner countries often have a relatively highly 
developed society, many are middle income although some are very poor, and distances 
are huge both within the continents and in relation to the EU. Their economic and 
political situation, the relatively new mutual awareness approach between them and the 
EU, and the objective of increasing EU presence in “emerging” markets, drives co-operation 
towards partnership in which economic instruments play an important role. 
 
Mediterranean (MED) countries have a long tradition of trade with all parts of the world 
and with the EU in particular, due to their long common border. However, political 
relations between the two regions have been troubled during the course of history. 
Mediterranean countries are in general low- or middle-income economies, while security 
issues are a priority for the EU in its relations with this region. Furthermore, institutional 
changes in the private and public sectors play an increasing role in the region, which is 
historically state-led. One of the main objectives of the co-operation is to create a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area. 
 
Security is also one of the foremost concerns in co-operation with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Nuclear activities in these territories are the most insecure in 
the world and compound widespread economic and physical insecurity in the region. Their 
recent status as independent states has necessitated a thorough process of transition from 
a planned to a market economy, with very high social costs. Therefore the key institutional 
foundations of a market economy and democracy have to be established. Furthermore, the trade 
interdependency between the Russian Federation and the EU is significant, and trade 
benefits will increase once the elements of a regulated market economy are in place. 
 
In the Balkans, after an initial period of co-operation concentrated on post-war 
reconstruction, EU co-operation has developed a more strategic focus and currently aims 
at the stabilisation and association process in these countries in relation to the European Union. 
It covers inter alia the following: reconstruction; stabilisation of the region; return of 
refugees; support for democracy, the rule of law and human and minority rights; the 
development of a sustainable market-oriented economy; poverty reduction and gender 
equality; and interregional co-operation. EU co-operation is part of the Stability Pact 
agreed between major donor countries, regional and international organisations and 
international financing institutions. Because of its geographical proximity to, and 
consequent interest in, the reconstruction of the area, the EU’s stake in the stabilisation 
and association process is very strong. 
 
These regional differences are reflected in the objectives and implementation modalities of 
EU co-operation policy. Indeed, the EU Treaty and the Commission Communication 
(2000)212 on Development Policy state that Community development policy shall foster: 
(i) poverty reduction, (ii) integration into the world economy and (iii) sustainable 
development, while at the same time contributing to the development and consolidation of 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
In addition to these goals, external relations with non-OECD countries address the issues 
of security and stability and aim at enhancing the political, economic and cultural presence 
of the EU in these regions. These objectives are articulated and have different priorities for 
each of the co-operation programmes. 
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Poverty reduction is the main goal of the EC co-operation programme with the ACP 
countries. EU relations with the CIS and the Balkans are also concerned with poverty 
reduction and specifically address the adverse social consequences of transition. Similarly, 
co-operation with the poorest Asian and Latin American countries has as its main 
objective the reduction of poverty. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement places 
among its long-term objectives the establishment of an area of prosperity through 
sustainable and balanced socio-economic development and poverty reduction. 
 
Integration into the world economy is a EU objective that concerns all regions covered 
by its external relations policy. The ACP group faces a major challenge in this sense due to 
its marginal position in the world economy. Trade liberalisation is seen as an essential 
contribution to development and poverty reduction. In the Balkans, MED and ALA, 
regional co-operation is an objective as such, being at the same time a means to trade 
liberalisation and, therefore, integration of these countries into the world economy. As 
regards the CIS and the Balkans, as areas bordering the EU their integration into the EU 
co-operation area and the abolishment of trade barriers must precede association with the 
European Union. 
 
Security and stability are seen as major elements in the building of democracy, 
establishment of the rule of law, and respect for human rights. These objectives are at the 
same time pre-conditions for all European co-operation interventions. Further, Building 
peace and ensuring physical security are the EU’s prime concerns towards re-establishing 
stability in the Balkans in parallel with post-war reconstruction. Within this framework, 
improved living conditions for displaced persons and refugees after the years of conflict 
are among the goals of EU relations with these countries. Some ACP countries and parts 
of the CIS (Caucasus and Central Asia) and Mediterranean regions also attract EU support 
in these areas. 
 
Enhancing the EU’s political, economic and cultural presence in the region is the 
main feature of EU external policy in the ALA countries. The intermediate level of 
development of most these countries and their geographical distance from the EU steer 
co-operation into areas of mutual interest to both regions, from private investment to 
cultural awareness. Similar elements can be found in other territorial zones, for example 
the third pillar of the Euro-Med Partnership or cultural co-operation with the ACP 
countries. 
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2.2 The Commission’s strategy for support to PSD 
2.2.1 The international background to the evolution of the strategy 
Until the mid-1980s the development paradigm was strongly influenced by the idea that 
international markets favoured industrialised countries. Accordingly, developing countries 
could only grow behind protective trade barriers that kept out exports from the 
industrialised world. Therefore autonomous or self-sufficient development was 
encouraged. Further, it was believed that free markets alone could not generate adequate 
growth and the necessary structural economic changes, and that governments had to have 
a major role in planning and promoting the economy, including public sector enterprises 
to undertake the investments that the market would not provide. 
 
In the late 1980s, however, the failure of these policies and the success of mainly Asian 
export-oriented economies led to a serious questioning of protectionist approaches. The 
weaknesses of the macro-economic environment were identified as the main problem and 
IFIs and donors responded with structural adjustment programmes. 
 
During the 1990s, other dimensions of national contexts, such as obstructive institutional 
settings, corruption, poor governance and unpredictable policy changes were also 
identified as major problems that needed addressing in the interests of promoting 
economic growth. 
 
Community co-operation with ACP countries reflects this evolution. The overall 
co-operation objectives have been made clearer over time. Addressing poverty has become 
explicitly the overarching objective of European aid to developing countries. Enhancing 
the competitiveness of developing country enterprises on the global market has also been 
identified as a necessary condition for promoting growth and poverty reduction. 
 
In other regions the situation was slightly different. In Asia and Latin America, the 
context was different and the relative weight of European aid was much more limited, 
preventing the EC from having the same influence on the institutional and economic 
framework. In these areas, the concept of “mutual interest between economic actors” was 
advanced and priority was given to the setting up of direct partnerships between 
institutions and companies from these regions and their European counterparts6. EC 
co-operation with countries eligible for assistance through the TACIS and CARDS 
programmes was almost non-existent until the early 1990s. The CARDS programme 
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) was 
established after the conclusion of the OBNOVA and PHARE programmes. 
 
Based on that background, the Commission approach to supporting PSD in ACP 
countries has been balanced, since the beginning of the period under review (1994), 
between three levels of intervention: “macro” (enhancing the macro-economic, 
institutional and regulatory framework to stimulate local and foreign investment), “meso” 
                                                 
6  COM(1995)495 on partnership with Latin America for the period 1996-2000 and, later on, COM(2001)469 on the 
strategic framework for enhanced partnership between Europe and Asia. 
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(supporting intermediary institutions such as the financial sector or representative 
organisations); and “micro” (direct financial and non-financial support to enterprises)7. 
This approach was clearly formulated in the 1998 Communication on private sector 
development in ACP countries8. 
 
In May 1999 the Council extended to all developing countries the approach based on the 
1998 Communication. More recently the European Commission has issued two important 
documents on private sector development: the COM(2003)2679 and the Guidelines on 
PSD support10. The main innovations of this strategy are: a harmonised Community 
approach and the proposal to focus on five areas of intervention. These documents 
present the official position of the Commission on PSD support. 
2.2.2 Reconstructing the rationale of Community support for PSD 
Often, complex policies and strategies are presented in policy documents without 
including an explicit logical framework. Yet to carry out an evaluation of such policies or 
strategies, the evaluator must identify and rank the objectives of the strategy. In this 
context, an intervention diagram is an effective tool for reconstructing and presenting the 
framework of objectives. 
 
In the case of Community support to PSD, the strategy is presented in the COM(2003)267 
and the Guidelines but no logical framework is provided. Therefore, one of the first tasks 
of the evaluation team was to infer the intervention logic of Community support to PSD 
and present it diagrammatically. The resultant diagram was used to identify and structure 
the data collection needs including the undertaking of interviews and, at the next stage, to 
identify the appropriate Evaluation Questions that would govern the overall analysis. A 
detailed explanation of how the intervention logic was reconstructed and of the main 
underlying assumptions is presented in Annex 4, Section 3. The following paragraphs 
present a brief summary. 
… based on the most recent policy declarations 
The COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines are fairly recent and therefore could not have 
guided the interventions under evaluation. But it still seemed relevant to use them as the 
basis on which to reconstruct the logic of the Commission’s interventions in the sector. 
Indeed the five areas of intervention proposed in the above-mentioned documents cover 
most past interventions (Annex 5, Sections 2 and 3), and despite of the lack of fairness of 
                                                 
7  See notably the Convention of Lome IV, art 111, Mauritius, November 1995; Le Livre Vert sur les relations entre 
l’Union Européenne et les pays ACP à l’aube du 21ème siècle, Brussels 1997, p 35-36; and the Convention of 
Cotonou, June 2000, art 21. 
8  A European Community strategy for Private Sector Development in ACP countries, COM(1998)667 final - 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Hereafter referred to as 
COM(1998)667. 
9  European Community Co-operation with Third Countries: The Commission’s approach to future support for the 
development of the Business sector, COM(2003)267 final - Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. Hereafter referred to as COM(2003)267. 
10  Guidelines for European Commission Support to Private Sector Development, version 1, 2003. Hereafter referred to 
as PSD Guidelines or simply Guidelines. 
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the basis for judgement in this limited sense, assessing the interventions against the most 
recent strategy improves the usefulness of the evaluation since it allows provision of 
recommendations more relevant to future decision-making. 
… with one framework for all regions 
It was also decided to attempt to reconstruct one single intervention logic to reflect EC 
support to PSD in all regions. Interventions in the five regions differ according to their 
specificities and to the different priorities of the EU policies in these regions, as presented 
in Section 2.1. However, since 1999 the EC has set out a single coherent framework within 
which support for the business sector is harmonised in all third countries, which justified 
launching this global sector evaluation instead of five regional ones. 
… and different levels of objectives 
The diagram in page 9 presents the links between: 
 the five overall objectives of the European co-operation and development policy as 
stated in section 2.1; 
 the specific objective11 of the Commission’s PSD strategy aimed at contributing to 
these overall objectives, namely enhancing the competitiveness of the business 
sector12 of third countries in local and international markets13; 
 the expected results needed to achieve this specific objective, which largely 
correspond to the five areas of intervention proposed by the COM(2003)267 and 
the Guidelines14; and 
 the activities carried out to deliver these results. 
 
As prioritisation of these objectives and the activities carried out to achieve them are not 
identical in all geographical regions, the general diagram was adjusted to reflect regional 
realities (see Annex 4, Section 3). Overall, given that the specific objective of the 
Community support to PSD is unique and is the same in all regions, it was concluded, at 
the structuring stage of the evaluation, that: 
 it was possible to identify a common set of objectives against which the 
interventions can be evaluated, despite regional variations in terms of priorities; and 
 it was possible to define the scope of what is understood by EC support to PSD 
as all interventions aiming at enhancing the competitiveness of the business 
sector of third countries in local and international markets. 
 
                                                 
11  The terms “specific objective” and “purpose” are used as synonyms in this report. 
12  ‘Business sector’ is defined as including private and public owned enterprises operating under market conditions. 
Agricultural production has been excluded from the analysis but not agricultural products processing. The common 
expression ‘Private Sector Development’ covers in fact the development of the business sector. 
13  As substantiated in Annex 4, Section 3, overall and regional policy documents are at one in defining the aim of the 
Commission’s support to PSD as enhancing the competitiveness of the business sector of third countries in local and 
international markets. 
14  The expected results derived from the five areas of intervention have been complemented by two expected results 
derived from the analysis of the portfolio of EC interventions to support PSD. 
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Capacity of intermediary 
professional organizations is 
enhanced
Macroeconomic, legal and 
regulatory framework is 
more conductive to PSD
TACIS
Main objective: Support 
to the process of 
transition towards a 
market economy
Contribute to a 
sustainable economic, 
social and 
environmental 
development in third 
countries
(Nice Treaty, 
COM(2002)212, etc.)
Contribute to the 
gradual integration of 
third countries into the 
world economy
(Nice Treaty, 
COM(2002)212, etc.)
Contribute to reduction 
and eventual eradication 
of poverty in third 
countries 
(Nice Treaty, 
COM(2002)212, etc.)
Contribute to building 
peace and ensuring 
political stability and 
security in third 
countries
(Nice Treaty, various 
regulations)
Enhancement of the 
political, economic and 
cultural presence of the 
EU
(Nice Treaty, various 
regulations)
Overall Objectives
To strengthen the 
business sector by 
enhancing its 
competitiveness in 
local and international 
markets
Support for institutional and structural reforms 
with a direct effect on PSD
Support to firm's restructuring and privatisation
Support to facilitate partnership between firms 
(meetings, workshops, forums, etc.)
Support to enhance human resources and 
capacities (training, etc.)
Support to local financial institutions & the 
reinforcement of a reliable financial system
Upgrading of local firms (TA, development of 
management skills, etc.)
Support to intermediary organisations 
representing the private sector
More investment & 
business-to-business co-
operation
More effective (non-
financial) services 
increasing SME's 
competitiveness
Development of micro-
enterprises
Purpose ActivitiesExpected Results
Enterprises' management 
and organization improved
Encouragement of transfers of know-how and 
technologies & support to cooperation between 
industry and scientific research
Encouragement of trade and investment 
between European and local companies
Support for the development and creation of 
SME's and micro-enterprises
Direct capital contributions to local companies 
or to financial intermediaries
MEDA
Main objective: 
Création of a Euro-
Mediterranean free 
trade area
ACP
Main objective: Support 
to the fight against 
poverty
Latin America
Main objective: Support 
socio-economic 
developement
CARDS
Main objective: Support 
to the process of 
stabilization and future 
association 
EU cooperation with 
third countries
Support for institutional and structural reforms 
with an indirect effect on PSD, including budget 
support
Financial markets are 
reinforced and their capacity 
to finance investment is 
increased (including micro-
finance)
* Note: EU's external policy includes, among otrhers, its Trade 
Policy, Development Policy and Foreign and Security Policy.
The objectives selected are here those to which the Private Sector 
Development Support Policy can contribute
EC's Support to Private Sector Development
Asia
Main objective: Support 
socio-economic 
developement
EU's External Policy*
Diagram 2.1 - Intervention Logic of Community Support to Private Sector Development 
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2.2.3 PSD Thematic Network 
Elaboration of the two afore-mentioned key documents on EC PSD support was the 
responsibility of the PSD Thematic Network, an informal group formed by EC staff 
from EuropeAid, DG-Dev and RELEX. The network has functioned at HQ level as a 
platform for exchanging experience between officials with geographical or horizontal 
responsibilities in the sector. They also discussed their respective experiences and the 
outcomes of debates in international fora or with other donors. In addition to the 
elaboration of the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines, the network has created a thematic 
intranet website available to staff in Brussels and the Delegations. 
 
Following a recent reorganisation in EuropeAid (spring 2005), many members of the 
Thematic Network have been transferred to a new Unit, under the Operations Quality 
Support Directorate of EuropeAid, dealing exclusively with business, trade and regional 
integration. The new Unit will probably revise the organisation of the Network. However, 
prior to these changes the evaluation team carried out a survey of EC Delegations with 
the objective of, on the one hand, investigating the Delegations’ knowledge and use of the 
PSD Thematic Network website and, on the other, assessing the Delegations’ needs in 
terms of the exchange of thematic information tools, including the type of information 
needed and the most appropriate channels. 
 
The survey showed that the Delegations’ knowledge and use of the PSD network 
website is so far limited, 33% of respondents (out of 16) being aware of the website’s 
existence and only 13% using it. Reasons given for the lack of knowledge included the fact 
that the website is relatively new, the lack of “proactive” promotion of the network and 
website, and the high turnover of staff at the Delegations coupled with the lack of 
information-sharing between the rotating staff. Reasons given for the limited use of the 
website include the belief that the information it contains is too limited for their needs and 
that a website is not a sufficiently pro-active channel for exchanging information or tools. 
Given that most respondents did not use the website, very few insights were generated 
into the type of information or tools used most frequently.  
 
In terms of needs assessment several aspects were highlighted. Respondents contended 
that while the overall objectives of EC support to PSD (e.g. poverty reduction) may be 
known, there is a lack of guidance on the best methods of contributing to achievement of 
these objectives. Such guidance is particularly relevant for PSD interventions. Support for 
PSD as a development activity implies a significant change in perspective on the part of 
many stakeholders, as well as some Commission staff, on issues such as the role of the 
State in the economy and the acceptance that the private sector plays an important role in 
development.  Moreover, PSD interventions are rendered complex by the fact that, first, 
they are transversal insofar as they may imply interventions both at government level and 
at firm level, and, second, that PSD is interdependent with interventions in other sectors 
(e.g. trade, infrastructure). Finally, intervention in this sector is fairly new. Consequently, 
the build-up of knowledge about successful PSD intervention is still at an early stage. 
 
Further details on the possibilities for HQ support to Delegations at different stages of the 
programming cycle, as well as the best channels for providing such support as perceived 
by the Delegations, are presented in Annex 5, Section 7. 
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2.3 Implementation of Community strategy in support of PSD  
2.3.1 Looking for an inventory of EC interventions 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, to attain the objective of enhancing the competitiveness of 
the business sector of third countries in local and international markets, a number of 
interventions have been carried out. To draw up an inventory of such interventions, the 
evaluation team used the Common RELEX Information System (CRIS) to compile a 
project list and so provide an overview of PSD interventions undertaken by the Commission 
in third countries from 1994 to 2003. Since there is no specific sector code for PSD, the 
evaluation team selected those sectors or sub-sectors which were most likely to include 
PSD-related projects. The building of an inventory entailed three steps: data collection, 
data “clearing”, and completion of the project list after cross-checking it against the lists of 
interventions provided by several EuropeAid Units in charge of PSD support in the 
different regions. For TACIS and CARDS countries, almost no project information was 
found on the CRIS database. The details of this process and the limits of the inventory, as 
well as the actual list of projects, are presented in Annex 5, Section 2. 
2.3.2 A descriptive analysis based on the inventory 
According to the inventory, a total of €4,249.73 million was committed to support for 
PSD in third countries between 1994 and 2003. The evaluation team analysed the 
geographical and thematic distribution of this commitment. Details of distribution by 
region, type of activity, beneficiary country (or sub-region), financing source and date are 
presented in Annex 5, Section 3. 
 
As shown in Graph 2-1, 37% of total commitments went to the Mediterranean region, the 
ACP region follows close behind with 36%, followed at some distance by Asia (12.6%), 
TACIS (11%) and Latin America (just under 4%). During the period of analysis, very few 
PSD interventions appear to have been implemented in the Balkans/CARDS region, 
according to the inventory. 
 
An analysis of distribution by type of activity shows that 37% of interventions focused on 
support for institutional and structural reforms with a direct or indirect effect on PSD followed by 
20.4% on support for enhancing human resources and capacities. Support for the development and 
creation of SMEs and micro-enterprises accounted for 14.3% of the total, followed by 
encouragement of trade and investment between European and local companies with 7.3% and support 
for firms’ restructuring and privatisation with 6.5%. A minor but not negligible amount was 
allocated to other types of activities: encouragement of transfers of know-how and technologies & 
support to co-operation between industry and scientific research (5.2%), support to local financial 
institutions & the reinforcement of a reliable financial system (4.7%) and upgrading local firms (2%). 
Support to facilitate partnership between firms (meetings, workshops, fora, etc.) and support to 
intermediary organisations representing the private sector together represented 2.2%. 
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Budget distribution by type of activity (all 
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Graph 2.1 – EC PSD interventions per region and per type of activity (1994-2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: A: Institutional & structural reforms; B: Human resources, C: Micro/SMEs, D: Trade/investment, E: 
Restructuring/ privatization, F: Know-how & technology, G: Finance/Banking, H: Others (upgrading local firms, 
partnership, intermediary organisations, direct capital). 
 
2.3.3 A closer look at a sample of 31 interventions 
The analysis of the inventory allowed only a first impression of the implementation of EC 
interventions in support of PSD. Therefore the evaluation team defined a sample of PSD 
interventions for detailed analysis. To elaborate such sample the decision was made to use 
an “administrative selection” process in collaboration with the Commission Services in 
charge of PSD interventions in the different geographical regions. The final sample was so 
defined as to guarantee a diversity of projects in terms of their geographical distribution 
and the area of intervention to which they belonged, and to ensure that some information 
was available in Brussels. The operation and limitations of this procedure are described in 
Annex 4, Section 2.2.5. 
 
The 31 projects selected are described in Annex 5, Section 4. They include 15 projects 
from ACP countries (2 from Dominican Republic, 3 from Ghana, 3 from Kenya, 2 from 
Niger, 3 from Senegal, 1 from Uganda, and 1 from Zambia), 10 from MEDA countries 
(6 from Egypt, 2 from Jordan and 2 from Tunisia), 4 from Asian countries (all from 
Vietnam), and 2 regional projects (Asia Invest and AL Invest). 
 
For each of these projects the evaluation team analysed both country programming 
documentation15 (Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programmes, Delegation 
Annual Reports) and project documents (financing agreements, terms of reference, 
progress reports, monitoring and evaluation reports). A synthesis of the information 
collected on these projects and relevant to the analysis is provided in Annex 5, Section 5. 
                                                 
15  In the case of regional projects, only regional and project documents were analysed. 
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2.3.4 Five country cases confirmed the findings from the sample… 
The information collected from the documentary analysis of 31 projects and programmes 
was cross-checked via country case studies. Countries for case studies were selected 
through discussions with the Reference Group. It was agreed that five countries would be 
visited from four co-operation programmes: two ACP countries (Zambia and Jamaica), 
one MEDA country (Morocco), one Asian country (Vietnam), and one Latin-American 
country (Mexico). It is worth noting that given the number of missions and the method of 
selection of the countries visited, the country missions were treated simply as individual 
case studies and not as a representative sample of EC support to PSD in third countries. 
The main objective was to cross-check the information collected during the desk study. 
 
For each case study an analysis of the country in the context of private sector development 
was carried out. This included the general economic, political and social context; a 
description of the economy with special emphasis on the business environment; the 
government’s policies and actions in support of PSD as well as Community and other 
donor support to the sector. Further, information for each Evaluation Question (except 
for EQs 1 and 2 which are only treated at the overall level) was collected and later 
organized in grids that allowed a horizontal analysis across all countries16. This 
information, as well as a fiche for each project analysed (37 projects across the 5 
countries), is presented in individual Country Notes in Annexes 6-10. The information 
from the case studies confirmed the initial findings for those elements on which 
information had already been collected during the desk study. The case studies, however, 
also brought to light new data which could not be collected through document analysis, 
such as information on the efficiency of the interventions. 
2.3.5 …as also did the interviews at HQ and the survey of Delegations  
To complement and cross-check the information collected, the evaluation team carried out 
interviews in Brussels with staff from the Commission or from other organisations such as 
the CDE or Pro Invest17. The team also designed and launched a survey targeted on 
Commission Delegations in third countries. The survey was conducted through a 
questionnaire containing one section for each Evaluation Question. In total, twenty-five 
Delegations were asked to respond to the survey, and sixteen responses were received. 
Once again, an administrative selection process was used in collaboration with the 
Evaluation Unit. The analytical results of the survey are presented in Annex 5, Section 6. 
Overall, the information collected through the sample reinforced the findings from other 
sources. 
                                                 
16  In fact, information was collected for the indicators that allowed to asses each judgement criterion that in turn allowed 
answering the evaluation questions. See Annex 4, Section 2.2.4 for a description of how the Evaluation Questions (EQs) 
were treated and Annex 4, Section 4 for the list of the EQs, judgement criteria, indicators and sources. 
17  See Annex 3. 
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Box 2.1 - Presentation of a synthesis of the findings 
A considerable body of information was collected during the course of this evaluation. To help the 
reader, this information base is presented in Annexes 5-10. Annex 5 is structured as follows: 
 Section 1 introduces the Annex and explains its contents. 
 Section 2 presents an inventory of 453 EC-funded interventions in support of PSD and 
the methods used to construct this inventory. 
 Section 3 presents a descriptive analysis of PSD interventions undertaken by the 
Commission across the various regions, based on the inventory of 453 interventions 
presented in Section 2. The analysis focuses on the distribution of planned interventions 
by beneficiary region, country, type of activity, source of financing and starting date. 
 Section 4 presents the sample of 31 PSD projects analysed more in detail during the Desk 
Phase of the evaluation. Projects are classified by country and a brief description of each 
project is included. Information includes project name, budget, starting date, objectives 
(overall and specific) and, in most cases, a comment or some complementary information. 
 Section 5 presents a synthesis of the information collected during the Desk Phase of the 
evaluation. It is organized according to the four evaluation criteria and three horizontal 
themes covered by the Evaluation Questions: relevance; effectiveness; sustainability; 
efficiency; coherence; coordination; and crosscutting issues such as gender, environment 
and good governance. 
 Section 6 presents the results of the survey conducted by the evaluation team via a 
questionnaire sent to 25 Delegations. The aim of the survey was to complement and cross-
check the information collected during the desk study on the design and implementation 
of the Commission’s PSD policy. 
 Section 7 contains the results of a complementary survey focused on the Delegations’ 
knowledge of the PSD Thematic Network and the use they made of it. 
 Section 8 presents a description of the PSD strategies of three major multilateral 
organizations: the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. 
Finally, Annexes 6 to 10 contain the Country Notes for the five field missions undertaken in 
Zambia (February 2005), Jamaica (April 2005), Mexico (March 2005), Morocco (April 2005) and 
Vietnam (April 2005). 
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3. Analysis 
This section presents the analysis of the information collected during the evaluation and 
presented in Section 2 and in Annex 5. The section is organized by evaluation criterion or 
horizontal theme: relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, efficiency, coherence, 
coordination and crosscutting issues. First, for each evaluation criterion or theme, the 
Evaluation Question(s) related to this criterion or theme is presented in a box along with a 
synthesis of the analysis. The full list of questions, including judgement criteria, indicators 
and comments is presented in Annex 4, Section 4. Second, the justification and meaning of 
the Question(s) in relation to the purpose of this evaluation is presented. Third, the 
analysis of the information, which in general follows the judgement criteria proposed for 
each evaluation question, is presented. 
3.1 Relevance 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
EQ 1 THE EC PSD STRATEGY RELIES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A MORE COMPETITIVE 
BUSINESS SECTOR CONTRIBUTES TO THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE EC 
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN THE DIFFERENT REGIONS. 
WHICH ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO VERIFY THIS CAUSE-EFFECT 
RELATIONSHIP? 
EQ2 IS THE EC PSD STRATEGY WELL DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF 
THE OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS SECTOR 
WITH A VIEW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OVERALL DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION 
OBJECTIVES? 
EQ3 DOES THE SELECTION OF THE AREAS OF INTERVENTION IN THE FIELD 
CORRESPOND TO THE EC PSD STRATEGY? DOES THIS SELECTION CORRESPOND 
TO CLEARLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITY NEEDS OF THE BENEFICIARY COUNTRY? 
SYNTHESIS 
The EC PSD strategy proposes five areas of intervention in support of private sector 
development. These areas cover what is considered to be a comprehensive strategy for 
supporting PSD. However, the strategy does not sufficiently explain the way in which 
interventions in these areas can contribute to enhancing business sector competitiveness. 
It is not sufficiently clear either on the mechanisms through which higher competitiveness 
can contribute to co-operation and development objectives. As a consequence, 
implementation of the strategy in the field is uneven: it is not clear why a decision is made 
to intervene in one area in one specific country; and furthermore the specific objectives of 
EC-supported PSD programmes at country level do not always correspond to the 
objectives of the strategy. 
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3.1.1 Justification 
Assessing the relevance of the EC PSD strategy entails three aspects: first, an assessment 
of the relevance of the objective of the strategy against the overall objectives of the EC 
co-operation and development policies; second, an assessment of the general design of the 
strategy; and finally, an assessment of the relevance of the strategy against the specific 
needs of each country of intervention. Each of these three aspects has been reflected in 
one Evaluation Question. 
3.1.2 Analysis 
3.1.2.1 Is enhancing business sector competitiveness a relevant objective? 
(EQ 1) 
Assessing the relevance of the EC PSD strategy entails in the first place an evaluation of 
the relevance of the specific objective (purpose) of the strategy against the issues addressed 
by the overall objectives of the EC’s co-operation and development policies, on the 
assumption that those objectives reflect identified problems or needs of the EU or 
beneficiary countries. The objective of Community support to private sector development 
in third countries is to enhance the competitiveness of the business sector in these 
countries (cf. Annex 4, Section 3). In other words, Commission support to PSD will be 
relevant if the low competitiveness of the business sector in partner countries is indeed a 
major constraint preventing progress towards the achievement of EC co-operation and 
development policy objectives in these countries. As a direct assessment of such a 
politically fundamental statement is beyond the scope of this evaluation, the evaluation 
team has focused on examining whether the EC has correctly analysed this assumption. 
Two aspects were taken into consideration: (i) whether the strategy explicitly tests and 
justifies the proposition that a more competitive private sector will contribute to achieving 
co-operation and development objectives and (ii) whether this analysis and justification are 
convincing or are shared by the main donor institutions and Member States. 
 
As presented in the final report of the Desk Phase18, links between the competitiveness of 
the business sector in partner countries and the overall objectives of the EC co-operation 
and development policies are listed in EC PSD policy documents19 and particularly in the 
Guidelines (for instance, see Section 2 of the Guidelines). These policy documents also 
make explicit reference to theoretical work done by other donor institutions, such as the 
World Bank, the Development Aid Committee of the OECD (DAC) or the United 
Nations (UN). These institutions share the view that PSD is a critical dimension of 
economic growth and hence of poverty reduction. Some of these organizations have 
developed their own strategies and approaches to PSD support, presenting their own 
institutional vision. However, EC PSD policy documents do not provide a detailed 
analysis or description of how a more competitive business sector contributes to 
the different overall co-operation and development goals. As a consequence, the 
                                                 
18  Cf. Section 4.2.1 of the Desk Phase of the Evaluation of EC Support to Private Sector Development in Third 
Countries, ADE (2004). 
19  Through this report, EC PSD policy or strategy documents refer to the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines. 
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conditions for ensuring that PSD interventions effectively contribute to overall 
co-operation and development objectives are not clearly stated. It is not clear to all staff 
why and how the EC should support the development of the private sector within the 
framework of the development and co-operation policies, which in turn produces a gap 
between the strategy and its implementation (cf. Section 3.2 on Effectiveness). 
3.1.2.2 Is the strategy proposed the best way to attain the objective of 
enhancing business sector competitiveness? (EQ 2) 
As the strategy is organized around five areas of intervention, the question covers whether 
these areas are indeed relevant to the specific objective of PSD support (i.e. to enhance the 
competitiveness of the business sector); whether conditions have been defined for each 
area; whether the defined areas are sufficiently comprehensive for tackling PSD support; 
and whether potential complementarities or priorities between areas have been identified. 
a) Is each area relevant? 
As stated in the COM(2003)267, the Commission’s approach to supporting PSD 
comprises five areas of intervention20. The relevance of each of these areas relies on the 
assumption that these areas address the main constraints hampering business sector 
competitiveness. One can find some analysis and justification of the relevance of each area 
of intervention in policy and orientation documents such as the COM(2003)267 and the 
Guidelines. However, the analysis and justification - where they exist - are limited 
and often rely on implicit assumptions. Yet research on how these areas of 
intervention can contribute to enhancing business sector competitiveness does exist21. A 
more detailed analysis would allow staff to better understand the mechanisms of PSD and 
contribute to building a common EC vision on support for private sector development. 
b) Were conditions defined for each area? 
Based on current research and on past experience of Community support in the sector, 
conditions could be identified for each area of intervention. Some of the conditions, which 
apply to more than one area of intervention, were identified through this evaluation and 
include the following: 
 A macroeconomic environment, legal and regulatory framework conducive to business 
growth, or at least that does not deteriorate. 
                                                 
20  Also called fields of action in the PSD Guidelines. 
21  Several institutions carry our research on private sector development. For instance, the World Bank (cf. the 
programmes on “Doing Business - Removing Obstacles to Growth” and “Investment Climate”), the Committee of 
Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development (with working groups on Business Environment and Business 
Development Services, for example), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and many others. 
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 A comprehensive diagnosis of the main elements conditioning success in a given area of 
intervention22. 
 A pro-active beneficiary government with the capability and willingness to collaborate 
and undertake reforms. This involves the capacity for speedy decision-making in 
pace with donors’ approaches, continuing progress in the national policy agenda, 
and the ability to provide the necessary legislative and fiscal environment23. In the 
area of business environment for instance, recurring examples of low government 
support include rejection by policymakers of relevant reforms proposed by the 
EU, or the non-acceptance and non-enforcement of legal & regulatory reforms 
proposed by legislative bodies. 
 A proper response to anticipated external events which could put at risk the attainment of 
a desired result24. 
 A flexible donor, which is important in the context of PSD interventions for two 
reasons. First, given the dynamic character of PSD interventions, it is important 
for programmes to remain flexible so as to ensure they can adapt and thus remain 
relevant to changing market conditions and government PSD policies. This is 
particularly important for EC interventions that are characterized by frequent 
implementation delays25. Second, understanding of PSD constraints (e.g. 
identifying market failures) often requires a trial-and-error exercise. The latter is 
facilitated when programmes are sufficiently flexible to allow programme managers 
to adjust their components26. Such flexibility however relies on high-quality 
management to make sound decisions. 
 
Yet, from the analysis of the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines, it is not clear whether 
conditions are defined for each area of intervention. Some conditions are mentioned 
but not in a systematic way. Neither is it indicated how to proceed if the conditions are 
not met in a given country: for example whether one should intervene in this area rather 
than that, whether one should work with the partner country to make progress towards 
meeting the necessary conditions, or indeed whether one should support PSD at all? 
 
Some of these conditions are mentioned in Country Strategy Papers (often under general 
“assumptions and risks”) and sometimes are repeated in programming documents. But 
they are usually formulated in a too general manner. In Vietnam for instance, while good 
governance issues and best administrative practices are mentioned as key features, there is 
                                                 
22  In Vietnam for example, it was noted that a reinforcement of financial markets involves the supply of a credit-line 
but also the provision of appropriate training to lenders, the removal of major legal obstacles faced by borrowers 
(e.g. access to land) and lenders (e.g. punishment following the approval of bad debt), and the capacity of borrowers 
to provide adequate financial information to lenders. In Morocco, reaching expected results in the provision of non-
financial services was conditioned on the firms’ ability to access finance in order to implement the investments 
recommended. 
23  In Morocco, delays in the decision-making between the EC and the government created difficulties in implementing 
some interventions. 
24  In Morocco, for example, it is not clear whether the end of the integration process as defined by the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) has been sufficiently taken into account. 
25  In Zambia for example, the time-lag between the implementation of an intervention targeting a specific industry was 
too long: at the time of implementation, the targeted industry had lost the “promising potential” identified during the 
identification phase of the intervention a few years earlier. 
26  In Zambia, the PSDP programme was sufficiently flexible to allow the programme manager to adjust the 
components of the programme in response to a new understanding of the prevailing market failure. 
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no reference to the specific institutional bottlenecks constraining the development of the 
private sector. Even in cases when conditions are mentioned in strategy or programming 
documents, the latter rarely elaborate on how the strategy should be adapted if the 
identified constrains and risks are not borne out. Further, some of the above-mentioned 
conditions are not mentioned at all in strategy or programming documentation, often 
because they have not been properly anticipated (e.g. the link between financial and non-
financial services in Morocco). 
c) Is the set of areas of intervention proposed comprehensive? 
An important issue is whether the five areas of intervention are comprehensive enough to 
attain the specific objective of PSD support, namely enhancing the competitiveness of the 
business sector in local and international markets. Compared with other donors’ strategies 
and with what is done in the field by the EC and by other donors, it is possible to say that 
the five areas of intervention cover a comprehensive strategy for support to PSD. 
 
There are, however, a few other areas that are not explicitly covered by the strategy. This 
is, for instance, the case with ‘vocational training’ which is an important ingredient of the 
PSD strategy in Morocco and it is also present in Vietnam27. The Guidelines do include 
vocational training in the list of activities that could be included under Private Sector 
Development (page 11) and also as one of the activities carried out in MEDA countries 
(page 16); but they do not refer again to this activity when developing the different areas of 
intervention. Despite the positive experience in Morocco, the limited evidence on 
vocational training does not permit the evaluators to assess the relevance of this area of 
intervention. 
 
Another area not covered by the strategy is that of ‘privatisation and restructuring of 
enterprises’. Yet in some countries (for example, in the ACP, CARDS and TACIS regions) 
programmes of this type have been undertaken28. The COM(2003)267 mentions this type 
of programmes, at the macro- or institutional level (page 6) and to a lesser extent in the 
area of investment and business-to-business co-operation promotion activities. The 
strategy does not question the importance of privatisation and restructuring programmes  -  
particularly if undertaken in conjunction with broader economic reforms  -  for increasing 
competition and correcting relative prices and therefore for achieving more efficient 
allocation of resources and higher productivity. However, it also proposes “that the issue 
of privatisation and State Owned Enterprises should be addressed in a separate 
Communication” (page 13)29. 
 
                                                 
27  See Evaluation Question 3 and in particular Judgement Criteria 3.A.1 in both Country Notes. 
28  Note that the Intervention Logic proposed by the evaluation team as reflecting the EC PSD strategy (Annex 4, 
Section 3) includes activities dealing with privatisation and firm restructuring because this Intervention Logic is based 
both on policy documents and the observation of activities carried out in the field. 
29  The Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries with focus on Public Utilities: The Need to Assess 
all the Options, COM(2003)326 final - Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. 
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The last point is directly related to the problem of the definition of private sector 
development as a “sector” of co-operation. During the desk study, an operational 
definition of private sector development was proposed30 as including all interventions aiming 
at enhancing the competitiveness of the business sector in third countries. This definition, however, 
does not solve the problem of the links between private sector development support and 
support in other “sectors” such as trade, institutional capacity building or even more 
“classical” sectors such as transport, energy or education. Furthermore, private sector 
development does not always appear explicitly as a “sector” of intervention: it is not 
among the six priority sectors of intervention in CSP guidelines –  although it is included 
in the sector of trade and economic development  -  and there is no specific DAC code for 
it. This implies a certain “inconspicuousness” of PSD. It also implies that it is extremely 
difficult to identify EC PSD interventions. In fact, the Commission Services do not have a 
clear and common vision on the EC portfolio of PSD interventions31. 
d) Were complementarities or priorities defined among these areas? 
Finally, there is the issue of the relation between the different areas of intervention. Are 
some areas complementary? Is this complementarity being exploited in the best possible 
way? Should successful intervention in one area be considered as a pre-condition for 
intervention in another area? In general, these issues are not treated in policy orientation 
papers such as the COM(2003)267 and Guidelines. These documents treat each area in an 
independent way; they propose a menu of areas from which Delegations can choose. One 
notable exception is the area of macro- or institutional support. The COM(2003)267 
indicates (page 4) that it was “clearly mentioned in the Council’s Resolution of May 199932 
that it is the level on which the Commission should concentrate its activities (“More 
efforts must be undertaken for the analysis of the general policy and the institutional and 
regulatory framework in which the Private sector is active”)”. The Guidelines mention: 
 
“In the case of sectoral policies, a stable macroeconomic framework and a favourable institutional 
environment are essential prerequisites for achieving tangible and lasting development results. This 
is even more true for the private sector. The constraints on private enterprise in the developing 
countries are primarily connected with the role of the public sector. All studies and analyses point 
to the macroeconomic situation and the institutional and legal framework as major hindrances to 
national and foreign investment.” (page 22) 
 
However, these orientations are not reflected in the design and implementation of country 
PSD strategies. In the field, in none of the countries analysed was successful intervention 
in one area considered a pre-condition for intervention in another area. Some country or 
project documents mention certain conditions necessary for private sector development 
(such as the importance of economic infrastructure and human resources for “all forms of 
                                                 
30  Cf. Section 3.3.2 of the Desk Phase of the Evaluation of EC Support to Private Sector Development in Third 
Countries, ADE (2004). 
31  Annex 5, Section 2 presents an inventory of EC PSD interventions and details the sources and procedures used in 
compilation of the inventory, and its limitations. 
32  European Council (May 1999), Resolution on EC strategy for the development of the private sector in developing 
countries. 
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private sector development” as mentioned in Zambia’s CSP 2001-2007), but they do not 
explicitly state that prioritisation in these areas is necessary or desirable. 
 
On the other hand, it is observed that some complementarities are exploited in an implicit 
way, as they exist but they are not presented as an objective within the framework of a 
comprehensive country PSD strategy. This typically happens between meso- and micro-
level interventions, where business associations play an important role in the provision of 
non-financial services, support for micro-enterprises, or development of vocational 
training. On the contrary, interventions providing financial and non-financial services have 
less often been linked and this has been cited as a problem, for example in Morocco. 
3.1.2.3 Are country PSD strategies relevant? (EQ 3) 
Two criteria were used to assess whether a country PSD strategy is relevant. First, whether 
the areas of intervention chosen to support PSD in that country correspond to the areas 
proposed in the EC PSD strategy and, second, whether the chosen areas of interventions 
correspond to clearly identified priority needs of the country in terms of PSD. 
a) Do country PSD strategies correspond to EC PSD strategy? 
When evaluating the correspondence between the selected areas of intervention in a given 
country and those proposed in the EC PSD strategy, it was kept in mind that the EC PSD 
strategy was elaborated after the programming of many of the interventions covered in this 
evaluation. In spite of the latter, evidence from country missions suggest that the areas of 
intervention implemented largely correspond to the areas proposed in the EC PSD 
strategy. Yet, some evidence suggests that this correspondence is only partial. 
 
First, in some countries, there are PSD interventions in areas not covered by the EC PSD 
strategy. In Morocco, for example, and to a lesser extent in Vietnam, some EC 
interventions focused on vocational training, an area that was not explicitly referred to in 
the COM(2003)267 (see Section 3.1.2.2.c above). 
 
More important, even when the chosen areas of intervention in the field correspond to 
those proposed by the EC PSD strategy, it was observed that the specific objectives of 
the interventions did not always correspond to the expected results of the EC PSD 
strategy. This was frequently observed in the areas of financial and non-financial services. 
In these areas of intervention, EC programmes have focused on the direct provision of 
such services rather than on reinforcing local markets, as proposed by the EC PSD 
strategy33. 
 
In those cases where the areas of intervention chosen in the field do not fully correspond 
to those proposed in the EC PSD strategy, the question is whether the country PSD 
strategies should converge with the EC PSD strategy or rather whether the EC PSD 
strategy should reconsider its scope. While the coverage of this evaluation does not permit 
a thorough analysis of this question, some of the Evaluation Questions below provide 
                                                 
33  Cf. Country Notes (Annexes 6 to 10) Evaluation Question 4 – Effectiveness of financial and non-financial services. 
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insights. An important consideration is the extent to which a chosen area of intervention 
that falls outside the EC PSD strategy corresponds to the needs of the country. The 
relevance of chosen areas of interventions to country priority needs and policies is 
addressed next. 
b) Country PSD strategy correspond to identified needs of the country 
Generally speaking, the selected areas of interventions in the five countries analysed 
correspond to clearly identified needs of the countries and are in line with national 
policies in terms of PSD. However, evidence suggests that the selected areas may not 
always correspond to the priority needs of the country in terms of PSD. The evaluation 
teams could not, in most cases, identify why a particular area of interventions had been 
chosen from the set of relevant areas of intervention in a certain country. For instance, in 
no case did the evaluation team find evidence of a detailed analysis of the different 
constraints faced by the private sector or of the reasons to intervene, for example, at micro 
level rather than at the macro- or institutional level34. This raises questions as to whether 
the programmes implemented are the best way in which Community support to PSD can 
achieve its objectives, given its leverage position. 
 
It may be justified for a donor agency to intervene in a certain area, even if the latter does 
not correspond to a priority need, when the main priority needs are already being tackled 
by other donors or when the donor decides to focus on an area in which it has 
comparative advantage (for example, Zambia under the 9th EDF). But even under those 
circumstances, this type of choice must be explicitly expressed and backed by a thorough 
analysis of the key priority needs of a country in terms of PSD. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that certain countries have not, at least not until recently, 
developed a national PSD strategy with corresponding policies, which makes it difficult to 
determine to what extent EC interventions correspond to national policies in terms of 
PSD. The evaluation team found that to be the case in Zambia (under the 8th EDF) and in 
Morocco. In Zambia, the response strategy proposed by the EC is one of encouraging the 
government to elaborate and own such policies. 
 
                                                 
34  See also Section 3.2.2.1. 
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3.2 Effectiveness 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
4.1 TO WHAT EXTENT DID EC INTERVENTIONS MAKE THE INSTITUTIONAL, MACRO-
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK MORE CONDUCIVE TO 
PSD? 
4.2 TO WHAT EXTENT DID EC INTERVENTIONS REINFORCE FINANCIAL MARKETS? 
4.3 TO WHAT EXTENT DID EC INTERVENTIONS HELP INTERMEDIATE ORGANIZATIONS 
TO INCREASE THEIR CAPACITY TO CONDUCT POLICY DIALOGUE AND TO IMPROVE 
THE SERVICES PROVIDED TO AND USED BY ITS MEMBERS? 
4.4 TO WHAT EXTENT DID EC INTERVENTIONS INCREASE TRADE, INVESTMENT AND 
BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS CO-OPERATION? 
4.5 TO WHAT EXTENT DID EC INTERVENTIONS REINFORCE MARKETS FOR BUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES? 
4.6 TO WHAT EXTENT DID EC INTERVENTIONS HELP DEVELOP MICRO-ENTERPRISES? 
SYNTHESIS 
Overall, the effectiveness of EC PSD interventions depends on a series of recurring 
factors which were not systematically taken into consideration and therefore limited the 
interventions’ effectiveness: when selecting an area of intervention, the lack of detailed 
analysis often led to ad hoc area selection; during programme design, there was often a 
misalignment between programme-specific objectives and those proposed by the EC 
strategy,  a lack of correspondence between programme components and actual obstacles, 
limited outreach to and non-strategic selection of beneficiaries, and a lack of building on 
past experience. During programme implementation not all planned activities were carried 
out. Finally, there is an inadequate monitoring and evaluation system, with indicators too 
often focused on outputs rather than impacts. 
 
3.2.1 Justification 
According to the Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Result Based Management35, 
the term effectiveness refers to “the extent to which the development intervention’s 
objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved”. The same source notes that the 
term is “also used as an aggregate measure of (or judgment about) the merit or worth of an 
activity, i.e. the extent to which an intervention has attained, or is expected to attain, its 
major relevant objectives efficiently in a sustainable fashion and with a positive 
institutional development impact.” 
 
                                                 
35  OECD (2002), Glossary of Key terms in Evaluation and Result Based Management. 
 
EVALUATION OF EC SUPPORT TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
IN THIRD COUNTRIES ADE 
Final Report – December 2005 page 24 
In the frame of a global sectoral evaluation, it is relevant to analyze the effectiveness of the 
strategy rather than the effectiveness of (a series of) individual interventions. In order to 
analyze the effectiveness of the strategy, the evaluation team analyzed a sample of 
interventions representing the different types of interventions. Through six different sub-
questions, the analysis focused on whether the programme’s objectives were being 
achieved, on factors making for or hindering success, and on the solutions chosen - when 
appropriated - and their contribution to the overall EC strategy in support of private 
sector development in a given country. Finally, the team looked for common factors 
across the different types of PSD interventions and across countries. Indeed, while some 
aspects of the analysis vary according to the area of intervention, the evidence suggests 
that overall the effectiveness of EC PSD interventions depends on a series of recurring 
factors. 
3.2.2 Analysis 
3.2.2.1 Selecting an area of intervention 
Taking all areas of intervention together, what appears as most striking is that no detailed 
analysis is carried out by the Commission Services before selecting an area of 
intervention. The EC PSD strategy proposes five areas of intervention and in each 
country the focus is on one or several of these areas36. However, in the cases analysed, the 
selection of the areas of intervention remained ad hoc. In many cases, the decisions were 
taken because the choice seemed “evident” or was an extension of past Community 
support. There seems to be an underestimation of the importance of a sound diagnostic 
before deciding where and how to intervene to support PSD. For instance, the risk of 
inducing market distortions remains largely disregarded. 
 
When selecting an area of intervention, it is important to consider the comparative 
advantage of the Commission. Generally speaking, the Commission has a stronger 
comparative advantage in interventions at macro and institutional level. Reasons include 
first that the EC has a long experience of reinforcement of the institutional and regulatory 
environment within existing and prospective Member States (e.g. PHARE programme) as 
well as in third countries; second, that the relatively large size of EC interventions 
compared to other donors gives the EC greater leverage to intervene at the macro and 
institutional levels. In contrast, the EC may have a lower comparative advantage, for 
instance, in micro- and some meso-level interventions in the financial sector, compared to 
other institutions like the European Investment Bank. This has been already pointed out 
by the CGAP Peer Review of 2003 on microfinance operations37. 
                                                 
36  Cf. Evaluation Question 3 and in particular Judgement Criteria 3.A.1 in Country Notes (Annexes 6 to 10). 
37  CGAP (2003), Peer Review on the European Commission operations on Microfinance (Letter to Management – 
Executive Summary - Edited version). 
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3.2.2.2 Programme design 
a) Identification 
One key element of the analysis of the effectiveness of the EC PSD strategy was whether 
the programmes implemented in the field corresponded to the strategy as stated in the 
COM(2003)267 and Guidelines. As presented in Section 3.1.2.3.a, it was found that for 
most of the interventions dealing with financial and non-financial services and, to some 
extent, for interventions targeting intermediary organizations, the specific objective of 
the programme did not correspond to the EC strategy. In the case of micro- and 
meso-level interventions in the areas of financial and non-financial services, EC 
programmes often focused on the direct provision of services with a view to obtaining an 
immediate impact, rather than addressing the constraints that preclude correct functioning 
of the market. In the case of interventions targeting intermediary organizations, 
programmes mostly used them as operators for the provision of services; while this helped 
enhance their institutional capacity this was in most cases a secondary objective with a 
transitory impact. 
 
This lack of correspondence between programme objectives and the expected results 
stipulated in the EC PSD strategy can be explained by several factors: 
 Many of the programmes covered in this evaluation were designed before the EC 
PSD strategy was published. Yet many of the concepts embedded in the strategy, 
and particular those relating to business development services, had already been on 
the table for several years38. 
 The orientations of the EC PSD strategy appear not to have been sufficiently 
disseminated to Delegations39. 
 
A second element in identification is whether the planned activities of a programme 
correspond to the known obstacles to development in an area of intervention. For 
example, lack of access to finance can be attributed to a number of obstacles, including 
inappropriate credit dossiers on the part of borrowers, insufficient capacity to assess risk 
on the part of lenders, and government regulations that discourage lending. Many EC 
programmes were found ineffective at identifying the constraints hampering success40. The 
lack of correspondence between programme components and actual obstacles to 
development in an area is mainly explained by the lack of a comprehensive analysis of 
the constraints hampering success in an area of intervention.  
 
                                                 
38  For instance, the COM(1998)667 “A European Community strategy for private sector development in ACP 
countries”; the “Resolution on EC strategy for the development of the private sector in developing countries” of 
the European Council (May 1999); and the debate and conclusions on Business Development Services held in the 
frame of the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development. 
39  Cf. the survey carried out on the knowledge and use of the tools proposed by the Thematic Network (Annex 5, 
Section 7). 
40  In Morocco for example, the PAIGAM program aimed at facilitating access to finance through the setting up of a 
guarantee scheme but the program was ineffective at rising lending to SMEs. One explanation is that the cause for 
the lack of access to finance is not a problem of guarantee but rather the inadequate training on the part of lenders to 
assess the risk of lending to SMEs. 
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b) Outreach 
In spite of the orientations provided by the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines, and of the 
discussions leading to the elaboration of the Blue Book on BDS41, many meso- and micro-
level programmes continue to have a too limited outreach. Indeed, it was 
acknowledge in the past that traditional approaches where donors directly provide services 
to private firms, besides introducing perverse effects and market distortions, were limited 
by the small proportion of beneficiaries that the programme could reach as the number of 
beneficiaries is directly dependent of the size of the programme. This is still the case for 
nearly all PSD programmes at meso- and micro-level. The Blue Book mentions that the 
weaknesses of this type of programmes have often “been masked in industrialised 
countries by the much greater level of funding available”. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies 
to large programmes such as those in some MEDA countries. 
 
A different aspect of outreach is the selection of the beneficiaries of the programme. 
Some programmes target a wide range of beneficiaries in different economic sub-sectors 
while others focus on fewer beneficiaries or sub-sectors in view of their multiplier effect in 
the economy. This second option was less often observed despite its higher expected 
impact. 
c) Building on experience 
Another key factor of effectiveness is the extent to which lessons from the past have been 
taken into account. Lessons from past experience are important in PSD for at least two 
reasons. First, Private Sector Development is a relatively new area of development, which 
implies that learning-by-doing is part and parcel of the knowledge building process. 
Second, despite the country-specific economic and political characteristics, many countries 
face similar PSD constraints, which often demand similar solutions. 
 
It has been observed that there is no mechanism allowing the Commission Services 
to learn and transmit the lessons from past experience. This has been observed at all 
levels: HQ, regions and even country (ETV-I and ETV-II in Vietnam, or EDP I and EDP 
II in Zambia). Basically, the system relies on the personal experience of officials and 
project managers and on institutional memory, which is weakened by the high rotation rate 
of staff and the deconcentration process. 
 
A key player for a system correctly exploiting lessons from the past is the PSD Thematic 
Network. The network has functioned at HQ level as a platform for exchanging 
experience between officials with geographical or horizontal responsibilities in the sector. 
They also discussed experiences and debates from international fora or other donors. 
Some of their main outputs include the drafting of the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines, 
as well as the creation of a thematic intranet website. However, the network has not yet 
been able to pass this knowledge on to Delegations. According to the survey carried 
out by the evaluation team (cf. Annex 5, Section 7), few Delegations knew of the thematic 
network (33%) and even fewer use the website and other tools made available by the 
network (13%). 
                                                 
41  Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development (2001), Business development services for small 
enterprises: Guiding principles for donor intervention, Washington. 
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3.2.2.3 Programme implementation 
a) Carrying out activities 
Another identified factor affecting the effectiveness of PSD programmes is the extent to 
which all planned activities have been carried out in practice. In several cases, evaluators 
found that certain type of activities within a programme ended up not being 
implemented. This was mainly the case with micro- and meso-level programmes in the 
financial sector aimed at improving access to finance42. In such cases, the activities not 
carried out aimed to address supply-side constrains or the regulatory aspects of the market. 
It was the case with the Credit Scheme in Jamaica where implementation focused solely on 
the delivery of a credit line while technical assistance to the government to improve 
regulations affecting lending to MSME was not implemented. It was also the case with 
SMEDF-I in Vietnam, where training of participating banks to improve their lending-to-
SME capabilities was planned but not implemented. In both cases, the programmes ended 
by just providing a credit line whereas they were initially designed to tackle, in a more 
comprehensive way, SMEs’ limited access to credit. 
b) External conditions for success 
A further obstacle to the success of PSD interventions is the policy environment. For 
instance, the Evaluation of EC Country Strategy for the Dominican Republic found that 
“Interventions like (…) PASP placed little emphasis on improving the policy 
environment… This probably contributed to the limited impact and sustainability of these 
interventions” (page 38). Similarly, in Egypt, “In spite of 3 years of reform, the PS and 
exports are not responding as expected. The key factors identified to contributing to the 
lack of response are mainly bureaucratic trade and investment regulations and a slow pace 
of structural reform programme” (NIP 1996-98, page 2). Yet, few interventions are 
focused on the macro and institutional level even when, as mentioned in Section 3.1.2.2, 
the COM(2003)267 and Guidelines state that this is precisely the level at which the 
Commission should concentrate its activities. 
3.2.2.4 Programme monitoring and evaluation 
Finally, an adequate monitoring system is required to measure impacts and also to give a 
chance to initiate improvements where programme objectives are not being met. It has 
been observed that, very often, programme documents include neither baseline 
information nor explicit targets or objectively verifiable indicators. Furthermore, even 
where indicators do exist, they were often not monitored in practice. In some cases, the 
absence of indicators is explained by the “demand-driven” nature of the programme. In 
such cases, the programme is said to have reached its objective once the funds have been 
disbursed. This gives no indication on the outcomes and impacts of the programme and 
reflects an approach where disbursement of public aid is no longer a means but an end in 
itself. There is a pressure to disburse as fast as possible, possibly to compensate for delays 
                                                 
42  Cf. Evaluation Question 4 in Country Notes (Annexes 6 to 10). 
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incurred during the initial phases of the programme. In other cases follow-up and 
monitoring is limited to outputs but not to outcomes.  
 
The dearth of indicators is to some extent compensated for by the external monitoring 
system known as “Results-Oriented Monitoring” (ROM). The ROM contains two separate 
sections on “effectiveness” and “actual impact”, thereby providing programme managers 
and headquarters with some assessment and advice on the impacts of the programmes. 
Nevertheless, ROM reports have their own limitations: the quality of their assessments 
relies on the programme indicators themselves (in the absence of good outcome and 
impact indicators, ROM staff must often devise their own indicators within a limited time) 
as well as on the monitoring staff’s understanding of the PSD strategy so as to ensure that 
the programme is monitored vis-à-vis the objectives of the strategy. Moreover, they do not 
cover every PSD programmes. 
 
It thus appears that “results-based management” is a concept that has not yet been 
integrated in the field. According to this paradigm, different types of indicators are 
required to assess progress towards results, in particular output, outcome and impact 
indicators43. Table 3.1 shows the main difference between implementation monitoring and 
outcome monitoring.  
Table 3.1 - Key Features of Implementation vs. Outcome Monitoring 
Elements of Implementation Monitoring Elements of Outcome Monitoring 
(traditionally used for projects) (used for a range of interventions and strategies) 
 Description of the problem or situation  
before the intervention; 
 Benchmarks for activities and  immediate 
outputs; 
 Data collection on inputs, activities and 
immediate outputs; 
 Systematic reporting on provision of  
inputs, etc.; 
 Directly linked to a discrete intervention (or 
series of interventions); 
 Designed to provide information on 
administrative, implementation and 
management issues as opposed to broader 
development effectiveness issues. 
 Baseline data to describe the problem or 
situation before the intervention; 
 Indicators for outcomes; 
 Data collection on outputs and 
how/whether they contribute towards 
achievement of outcomes; 
 More focus on perceptions of change 
among stakeholders and more focus on 
“soft” assistance; 
 Systematic reporting with more qualitative 
and quantitative information on the 
progress  of outcomes; 
 Done in conjunction with strategic 
partners;   
 Captures information on success or failure 
of UNDP partnership strategy in achieving 
desired outcomes. 
Source: Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results, UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, 2002. 
 
                                                 
43  Output indicators assess progress against specific operational activities; Outcome indicators assess progress against 
specified outcomes; Impact indicators provide a broad picture of whether the development changes are actually 
occurring, i.e. they measure the general objectives in terms of private sector competitiveness. 
 
EVALUATION OF EC SUPPORT TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
IN THIRD COUNTRIES ADE 
Final Report – December 2005 page 29 
With regard to indicators specific to PSD programmes, a number of institutions and 
donor committees have put together implementation and outcome indicators. A 
number of these can be found in Annex 5, Section 9. By way of illustration, Table 3.2 
presents implementation and outcome indicators for the PSD programmes in Business 
Environment.  
Table 3.2 – Implementation and Outcome Indicators for PSD interventions aimed 
at improving the business environment 
Focus of donor 
intervention 
Donor-support 
reform 
instruments 
Indicators of change 
outcome 
Indicators of possible 
impact 
Private sector 
development 
strategy 
TA for reviewing 
and drafting 
strategies 
New or revised private 
sector development 
strategies prepared and 
adopted by government 
Increased investment in 
private sector 
Business 
regulations 
Regulatory impact 
assessment 
Improved understanding 
among policy-makers 
and regulators of the 
impact of regulations on 
business behaviour 
More efforts are taken to 
reduce the undesired 
impact of regulations on 
small enterprises 
Less regulatory bias against 
small enterprises 
Improving the 
representation and 
advocacy of small 
enterprises  
Supporting the 
development of 
business 
representative 
organizations 
Increase in the number 
of small enterprises 
participating in chambers 
of commerce and other 
forms of business 
organization 
Improved representation 
of small enterprises in 
chambers of commerce 
and other forms of 
business organization. 
Improved benefits for 
small enterprises to join 
chambers of commerce 
and other forms of 
business organization 
3.2.2.5 The case of horizontal programmes 
The decision to prioritise “horizontal” or “all-country” programmes over national or 
regional programmes was taken in the late 1980s for ACP countries. It was based on the 
identification of weaknesses in national or regional programmes which included the lack of 
a coherent approach among the different countries supported, lack of coordination, the 
difficulty of mainstreaming PSD in other sectors of support as well as delays in design and 
implementation. 
 
A number of advantages were associated with horizontal programmes and they are still 
relevant. In practice, however, the approach has been only partially applied or successful 
and in many cases they have replicated the same weaknesses as national or regional 
programmes. The following paragraphs review some of these potential advantages and the 
evidence found in relation to them. 
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 Provision of an overall, coherent and integrated approach at all three levels: 
A coherent approach was achieved within horizontal programmes as support across 
countries was harmonized. However, such an objective was more difficult to attain 
between the different horizontal programmes as no coordination mechanism was 
planned for those programmes. The same applies to coherence with national or 
regional strategies. Horizontal programmes have run parallel to national and regional 
programmes, coordination with the Delegations being almost inexistent. In many cases 
the Delegations were badly informed of the functioning of the horizontal programmes. 
National and regional programming is in most cases made without consideration of 
horizontal programmes. As a consequence, there are national programmes with the 
same type of activities as horizontal programmes. Worse still, there have been cases of 
competition between national and horizontal programmes as a result of differences 
between the cost sharing schemes. 
 
 Greater ease of coordination and coherence: 
As already mentioned above, there are no mechanisms for ensuring coordination with 
other EC PSD programmes, with EC support to other sectors or with other donors 
involved in PSD. As a consequence, horizontal programmes have been as unsuccessful 
as national and regional programmes in mainstreaming PSD in other sectors of 
support. Consideration was given to having focal points in some Delegations, for 
example staff members dedicated full-time to ensuring coherence and coordination 
between all PSD interventions. To the team’s knowledge, such posts were never 
created. The official in charge of PSD at Delegations is often responsible for other 
sectors also and is in charge only of national programmes. 
 
 Increased overall impacts: 
While horizontal programmes have yet to be evaluated, so far there is evidence that 
meso- and micro-level horizontal programmes have been successful at carrying out 
their activities but little is known about the impact they have had. Overall, follow-up 
after service delivery has been very limited, jeopardising attempts to measure impact. It 
is certainly difficult to carry out such follow-up given the nature of the sector. Further, 
the attribution problem is even greater than in other sectors. 
 
 Horizontal programmes were meant to cover the essence of PSD support in one country: 
This has not been the case. As mentioned above, Delegations continue to design and 
implement many PSD programmes and are subject to the demands of the partner 
government or the private sector. In fact, the Delegation continues to be the main 
channel through which Community support to PSD is provided in a given country. 
 
 Speed of implementation: 
Among the reasons for deciding to prioritise horizontal programmes was the need to 
overcome design and implementation delays associated with traditional programmes. 
The need for swift implementation is particularly important in PSD support. This is 
possibly the only aspect in which horizontal programmes are superior to national and 
regional programmes. While horizontal programmes usually entail a large and complex 
architecture, in the few cases analysed (EBAS, AL-Invest, Asia-Invest), once the 
programme was in place, it was implemented without much delay. 
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In conclusion, the horizontal programme approach is still appealing but seems not to be 
working as expected, probably because the Delegations are still the main channel for 
providing EC support and because there is no formal mechanism for co-ordinating 
support provided via horizontal programmes and support provided via national or regional 
programmes. Yet the advantages of sharing experience between different countries and of 
thereby accumulating sectoral knowledge should not be underestimated. 
3.3 Sustainability 
EVALUATION QUESTION 
EQ 5 TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE EFFECTS (EXPECTED RESULTS) OF THE 
INTERVENTIONS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AFTER THE END OF EC SUPPORT? 
SYNTHESIS 
The assessment of sustainability of PSD interventions takes into account both the 
sustainability of the benefits produced by the project and, when appropriate, sustainability 
of the activities proposed. Despite the lack of information on sustainability, the following 
elements could be highlighted. First, an environment conductive to PSD is a basic 
condition for the sustainability of all PSD interventions. Second, sustainability seems more 
likely when PSD interventions reach institutions or when the interventions contribute to 
improving private sector practices or competences. Third, sustainability of interventions in 
the business environment and for providing direct support for companies depend on the 
government’s involvement and commitment and particularly on its capacity and will to 
encourage a process of change once EC-funding is over. Finally, interventions are less 
likely to be sustainable when they offer direct support to private sector operation without 
generating a substantial change in behaviour, practice or knowledge. 
3.3.1 Justification 
Sustainability generally denotes whether the benefits produced by the project at purpose 
level are likely to continue after external funding ends and whether the project’s long-term 
impact on the wider development process can be sustained44. Sustainability, therefore, does 
not necessarily imply that the activities carried out, and even more the institutional set up of 
the project, should be sustainable. In some cases, however, it is desirable that the activities 
implemented through the project should be replicated by some other institution, even after 
the project has ended. This is particularly the case with PSD projects that aim to improve 
access to finance or that aim to develop a market for business development services. The 
present overall assessment of sustainability of PSD interventions takes into account both 
aspects: sustainability of the benefits produced by the project and, when appropriate, 
sustainability of the activities proposed. 
 
                                                 
44  Evaluation Guidelines, page 14. 
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3.3.2 Analysis 
Overall, it is difficult to assess the sustainability of the benefits of EC PSD interventions from 
the information available. Little information is available in relation to the indicators 
proposed by the evaluation team either during the desk study or during the country 
missions45. A few elements can nonetheless be highlighted: 
 
First, an environment conductive to private sector development is a basic condition 
for the sustainability of any type of PSD intervention, although in few cases is this 
explicitly stated. For instance, the Dominican Republic CSE stated: “Interventions like 
(…) PASP placed little emphasis on improving the policy environment… This probably 
contributed to the limited impact and sustainability of these interventions.” 
 
Second, sustainability seems more likely when PSD interventions positively affect 
institutions. This is the case with projects aimed at enriching and improving the private 
sector’s surrounding environment such as institutional support, capacity building and so 
forth, particularly when ownership is ensured, design is clear and appropriated, and 
beneficiaries are well defined. Projects aimed at harmonising practices or standards fit 
particularly well with this description (e.g. the Centre for Business Information (CBIK) 
under TDP in Kenya or establishment of the standards and metrology institution under 
EJADA). Other interventions providing institutional support also ensure sustainable 
benefits when these basic conditions are met. 
 
Some interventions contributing to improving private sector practices or 
competences also meet these conditions and are likely to produce sustainable benefits as 
the competences, when relevant to the beneficiaries, are an acquis. Although there is little 
information on the long-term effects of the projects, there are signs that beneficiaries 
indeed consider these projects highly useful. For instance, an ex-post evaluation found that 
the CBIK in Kenya was, a few years after the end of the project, well appropriated by the 
beneficiaries and was largely used and viewed by the operators as a most valuable tool. In 
Vietnam, on the other hand, the EBIC had “reached” some 6,000 interlocutors in some 
form or other (mainly workshops and seminars, enquiries and press reports) and its 
disappearance as a ‘one stop shop’ for information on the Single Market and on doing 
business with Europe appeared to be a general source of regret among the interlocutors, 
whether public or private sector representatives. 
 
Third, the sustainability of interventions depends on the government’s involvement and 
commitment and particularly on its capacity and will to encourage a process of change 
once EC-funding is over. This has already discussed above in the case of PSD 
interventions which benefit institutions, where government ownership is often key. The 
importance of government involvement was also noted in interventions providing direct 
support for companies, such as business-to-business co-operation. In Zambia for example, 
the sustainability of business-to-business activities after the end of EC interventions was 
said to depend strongly on dedicated support from the Government as it is a key player in 
dissemination of information to prospective investors about Zambia. 
                                                 
45  Cf. Section 3.2.2.5 above. 
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Finally, interventions are less likely to be sustainable when they offer direct support to 
private sector operations without generating a substantial change in behaviour, 
practices or knowledge. For example, in Jamaica’s Credit Scheme, the activities 
envisaged for strengthening the regulatory environment were not implemented. In 
Vietnam, while participating banks confirmed that the supply of credit-line gave a boost to 
their SME lending operations, it seems that overall the growth of lending to SMEs has 
been modest. In Vietnam also, the expected sustainability of the SMEDF relied on 
changing the behaviour of local financial institutions through training and hands-on 
operation. However, training was very limited and, in spite of high rates of reimbursement 
and effective loan operations, local operators were not interested in taking over the 
programme. One explanation for this is the negative real interest rates at which the programme 
worked. 
 
Indeed, financial and business development services have often been provided with 
subsidies in spite of the strategy proposed by the Commission as early as 1998: “[The 
Community will] only support activity that is sustainable in the medium-long term, without recourse to 
subsidy. Private enterprises should sooner or later be expected to bear the full cost of the credit or other 
services that it uses” (COM(1998)667, page 16). In many cases, sustainability was to be 
ensured through the transfer of the programme to local private operators but, most often, 
private operators were not interested in taking over the programme (e.g. SMEDF in 
Vietnam and EFP in Zambia). Jamaica’s Credit Scheme is, to a certain extent, a counter-
example: after the support from the EC ended, the government of Jamaica decided to 
continue with the programme. This was possible because the credit line was funded 
through a soft loan. The new programme is managed by local authorities (currently at the 
Ministry of Industry and Tourism) and continues on the same basis as in the past. 
Interestingly, the Delegation in Jamaica was not aware that this new programme existed. 
 
The survey carried out by the evaluation team (Annex 5, Section 6) further shows that few 
provisions exist for ensuring that business development services provided with 
Community support will continue to be provided after completion of the project or 
programme. Among the six Delegations that answered the question (out of 12 that 
answered the section on BDS), three indicated that provision for sustainability (such as the 
transfer to a private organization, strengthening of specific institutions or financial support 
to the government) is made. The other three admit that nothing or very few has been 
planned to ensure continuation of service provision. 
 
In summary, the provision of services at low cost (SMEDF in Vietnam, PASP in the 
Dominican Republic, EDP in Zambia and many others) has induced high demand for the 
services funded and therefore high disbursement rates but, at the same time, has weakened 
overall sustainability. Further, the weak sustainability of these projects is not unconnected 
with of their weak design or with the differences with the PSD strategy as prescribed by 
Headquarters and mentioned in Section 3.1.2.3a. 
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3.4 Efficiency 
EVALUATION QUESTION 
EQ 6 TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP OR MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES CONTRIBUTED TO OR HINDERED THE EFFICIENCY OF 
THE EC INTERVENTIONS TO SUPPORT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT? 
SYNTHESIS 
On the one hand, it was found that two key factors inhibit the efficiency of many EC 
programmes: the complexity of EC procedures and the delays incurred at different stages 
of the programme cycle. On the other, most sources agree that deconcentration has 
enhanced the efficiency of EC operations (quicker decision-making, better identification of 
needs and possible lower cost) even though it has also generated some concern (strategic 
aspects not yet sufficiently taken into account because Delegation staff are overloaded 
with operational tasks or because it is not sufficiently prepared for these new 
responsibilities; and sharing of experience may become even more difficult than in the 
past.) 
3.4.1 Justification 
Efficiency addresses the main features of programme implementation and evolution and 
assesses how far these features, notably resources and procedures, contributed to or 
hindered the achievement of the expected results at minimum cost. Four aspects were 
analysed in relation to the efficiency of EC interventions: (i) the deconcentration process 
and the support given by HQ; (ii) the preference given in some regions to all-country 
programmes; (iii) the preference given in some regions to promoting local expertise 
instead of using international support; and (iv) other organisational set-up or management 
systems and processes. Only the first and second aspects provided relevant information on 
the issue of efficiency. This information is analysed in the following paragraphs. 
Information collected on the other two aspects has been incorporated in the analysis of 
effectiveness. 
3.4.2 Analysis 
3.4.2.1 Deconcentration process 
According to several sources, it is still too early to assess the impact of the deconcentration 
process on the efficiency of EC interventions. But overall, they agreed that the 
deconcentration has contributed to the efficiency of EC interventions: 
 It has generally accelerated operational decision-making at programming and 
implementation level (including call for tenders, contracts and payments). In 
Jamaica for example, the deconcentration process has allowed for quicker decision-
making, closer contact with beneficiaries and better knowledge of the local 
situation. 
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 Is has generally led to better identification of needs, as experienced for instance by 
Morocco and Jamaica. 
 In terms of cost, little tangible indication is available, but some interviews suggest 
that implementation costs have possibly decreased owing to the improved quality 
of project management resulting from deconcentration. 
 
On the other hand, the deconcentration process has also brought some major concerns: 
 The heavier workload transferred to Delegations, not always with adequate 
additional resources (trained staff, etc) has often implied a strong focus on the 
operational aspects at the expense of strategic considerations. This will for instance 
be an issue in Morocco during the next programming period. 
 Lesson learning and sharing of experience between different countries or regions 
has been limited in the past and deconcentration, along with the high of rotation of 
personnel and the lack of support from Headquarters at strategic level, may 
actually worsen the situation. 
3.4.2.2 Organisational set-up and management system 
In terms of the impact of the organisational set-up and management system on efficiency, 
the evaluation teams found that two key factors inhibit the efficiency of many EC 
programmes: the complexity of EC procedures and the delays incurred at different 
stages of the programme cycle (Tunisia, Kenya, Zambia, Mexico, Dominican Republic). 
These two factors are not independent: the complexity of procedures accounts for part of 
the delays. Procedures are slow and heavy to the point that several sources declared their 
strong preference for working with other donor agencies. In a few cases delays were 
outside the EC’s control but in many other cases delays were internal to the design or 
implementation of the programme. These include, for example: 
 Slow pace of discussions with the partner government on intervention modalities 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Mexico). 
 Lack of precision of TOR and financing agreement which delays implementation 
(Vietnam). 
 Lack of anticipation of certain juridical, financial or procedural difficulties 
(Morocco and Mexico). 
 
Other factors that negatively affected efficiency were: 
 Difficulties in setting up the PMU, managerial practices of the steering committees 
(Vietnam, Mexico, Zambia, Morocco). 
 Delays in the adoption of sectoral strategies in several areas including PSD (Ghana, 
Zambia, Jamaica). 
 Capacity problems at the Delegation or in the NAO’s office (Ghana). 
 High management costs related to delays, changes of team and excessive 
formalism. 
 Procedures within some of the programmes considered too slow and heavy by the 
private sector. 
 Insufficient information on what the programme can offer and to whom (Zambia, 
Mexico). 
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Finally, factors that have contributed to efficient implementation of programmes are: 
 A good management unit (PSDP in Zambia, TDP in Jamaica, EME in Morocco). 
 The involvement of local consultants or the private sector in the management of 
programmes, as in Morocco and Zambia. 
3.5 Coherence 
EVALUATION QUESTION 
EQ 7 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE EC PSD STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT OTHER EC STRATEGIES AND POLICIES? 
SYNTHESIS 
EC PSD policy documents do not analyse how European policies or strategies can affect, 
positively or negatively, Community support to private sector development in third 
countries, the objective of which is to enhance the competitiveness of the business sector 
in national and international markets. Likewise, very few CSP analyse the coherence of 
Community support with European policies and PSD programme documents seldom if 
ever address the issue. Moreover, such aspects, although central to the appreciation of the 
programme’s impact, are not covered by follow-up, monitoring or evaluation procedures 
and reporting. 
Coherence with regards to EC support provided to third countries in other sectors is also 
not well ensured. Yet, trade, regional integration and macroeconomic support are three 
areas of co-operation that are becoming increasingly important for the EC and have 
immediate implications for PSD. 
3.5.1 Justification 
The degree in which the PSD strategy and its implementation takes into account other EC 
strategies, policies or interventions is important for enhancing aid effectiveness as well as 
for avoiding a contradictory approach and consequent waste of public resources. 
Coherence is analysed at two levels: first in relation to other European policies and 
strategies and second in relation to the support provided by the EC to other sectors in the 
same country (trade, transport, institutional support, etc). 
3.5.2 Analysis 
3.5.2.1 With regards to other European policies or strategies 
EC PSD policy documents do not tackle the issue of the coherence of Community 
support to PSD with other European policies or strategies. There is no analysis of how 
European policies could affect, positively or negatively, Community support to private 
sector development in third countries. Yet the objective of enhancing competitiveness of 
the business sector of third countries in national and international markets can be affected, 
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for instance, by EU trade policy, SPS measures, the Common Agricultural Policy, and so 
on. 
 
Indeed, the survey (Annex 5, Section 6) shows that, out of the 12 Delegations that 
answered on the section on coherence, 40% found that PSD interventions are affected by 
other European projects, programmes or policies and 27% stated that complaints have 
been expressed by the beneficiaries, the Government or the operators of PSD 
programmes concerning EU policies, regulations or programmes. The difficulties reported 
concerned: 
 The Common Agricultural Policy. 
 The regulation on Official Feed and Food Controls (COM(2003)52). 
 European trade restrictions on some processed agro-based products. 
 The too numerous programmes at “all-ACP”, regional and national levels. 
 
This absence of analysis is also reflected in country programming documents. Very few 
CSPs analyse the coherence of Community support with European policies or strategies. 
In most cases they mention one European policy or other but generally fail to indicate 
how coherence will be ensured. The only exception is Mexico, where the CSP raises quite 
frankly a number of issues representing a risk to coherence and mentions in particular the 
CAP and SPS controls, both seen by Mexican counterparts as protectionist policies 
preventing the access of Mexican products to the EU market. 
 
Similarly, PSD programme identification documents seldom if ever address the issue of 
coherence with other European programmes or policies. Moreover, such aspects, although 
central to appreciation of project impact, are not covered by follow-up, monitoring or 
evaluation procedures and reporting. 
 
Coherence with trade policy is nevertheless implicitly recognised and in part addressed by 
some Community PSD programmes. The trend has indeed been to increase the number 
and importance of trade-related components in EC PSD programmes and in particular 
those tackling market access issues. For instance, EBIC in Vietnam is meant to train local 
operators on how to deal with EU standards so as to develop their export capacity on EU 
markets. Equally, ETE and to a larger extent the successor IMP in Tunisia include 
Metrology, Standards, Testing and Quality components so as to comply with EU 
regulations and obtain accreditation. In Jordan, EJADA provides advice to SMEs about 
products that are under no or high quotas and that could easily enter the EU market. In 
Mexico the focus of the two PSD programmes is access to the European market as well. 
From this point of view, trade related assistance programmes aimed at increasing the 
capacity to access European markets are an important and necessary complement to most 
PSD interventions. Yet efforts should still be made. In Morocco, for example, it is not 
clear whether the end of the integration process as defined by the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC) has been taken sufficiently into account.  
3.5.2.2 With regards to EC support to other sectors 
Coherence with regard to Community support to sectors other than PSD is also not well 
addressed. In several cases, the CSP stresses the complementarity between support to PSD 
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and support to other sectors - mainly regional integration, trade or transport. However, in 
all cases this is just descriptive and is not reflected in programme design. An example is 
Zambia with transport (a major constraint to PSD), regional integration and 
macroeconomic support. In fact, trade, regional integration and macroeconomic 
support are three sectors that are becoming increasingly important for the EC and that 
have immediate implications for PSD. However in most cases, there is no analysis of 
the links and the possible ways of exploiting the complementarity of support in those 
different sectors. 
Box 3.1 - PSD and Trade 
Most PSD programmes incorporate the objective of increasing the private sector’s 
competitiveness to expand the countries’ or regions’ export capacity, thereby contributing 
to export-led growth. Full delivery of such programmes therefore implies that new or 
upgraded export capacities should not be constrained by trade policy provisions limiting 
market access. From this point of view, coherence is a real issue as market access is today 
mainly restricted by the implementation of technical barriers to trade or rules of origin, 
which become more and more complicated and drastic. In some cases, this has even led 
preferences granted by the EU to partner countries to become almost meaningless. See 
for instance, the assessment by Brenton and Manchin (2000) on the extent to which 
preferences granted by the EU remain barely exploited by the beneficiary countries owing 
to the restrictiveness and complexity of the regime governing the associated rules of 
origin46. 
From available sources, it is nevertheless difficult to assess the extent to which the 
existence of such trade policy provisions materially affects Community’s PSD 
interventions. Project identification seldom if ever addresses the issue of coherence with 
other European programmes or policies. Moreover such aspects, although central to 
appreciation of the project’s delivery, are not covered by follow-up, monitoring evaluation 
procedures and reporting. 
 
                                                 
46  Brenton P. and M. Manchin (2002), “Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of Origin”, CEPS 
Working Document N° 183. According to their findings, only one third of EU imports from developing countries 
which were eligible for preferences actually entered the EU market with reduced duties. 
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3.6 Coordination 
EVALUATION QUESTION 
EQ 8 TO WHAT EXTEND IS THERE DONOR COORDINATION BOTH AT CENTRAL AND AT 
COUNTRY LEVEL? 
SYNTHESIS 
Donor coordination at central level is ensured by the Commission Services and shared 
through the Thematic PSD Network. At country level, the effectiveness of coordination 
practices has improved recently although it is still quite varied. Sharing of information 
between donors and with the government has improved significantly but few joint 
activities or projects are still in evidence. Furthermore, the risk of overlap was found to be 
important, especially for meso- and micro-level interventions. It is in this type of 
interventions where effective coordination is sometimes hampered by national interests. In 
spite of this, donor coordination is possible in specific areas of intervention where 
conflicts of interest are less in evidence (e.g. legal and regulatory framework, institutional 
capacity and policy dialogue) as well as in areas in which the potential for coordination 
across areas of intervention is high, such as local economic development. 
3.6.1 Justification 
Donor coordination is important in all sectors of co-operation and even more so in PSD. 
Interventions at macro- and institutional level are particularly sensitive to contradictory 
approaches between donors: un-coordinated approaches may undermine policy dialogue 
and jeopardize the effectiveness of the intervention. At meso- and micro-levels, lack of 
coordination may induce overlaps, even subsidising the same firms or organisations twice. 
Overall, coordination among donors is critical to a comprehensive approach to private 
sector development in dialogue with the partner government and for avoiding waste of 
public monies. 
 
This question analyses whether the Commission Services participate in multi-donor 
coordination processes at central and country levels - particularly with Member States - 
and with what results. The aim was to understand whether there are established 
coordination procedures between donors, whether there are cases of explicit co-operation 
or whether there have been cases of “competition” between donors (for instance, focusing 
on the same successful sectors or enterprises or protecting the interests of their “own” 
national enterprises at the expenses of the overall effectiveness of the PSD policy, etc). 
3.6.2 Analysis 
At central level, the Commission Services participate in international fora such as the 
OECD-DAC, the Committee of Donor Agency for Small Enterprise Development 
(SEDONORS) or the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). Other Commission 
Services at HQ also participate in discussions through different channels but the main 
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channel is the PSD Thematic Network, where different Services meet to discuss PSD-
related issues. However, the extent to which the outcomes of these discussions are 
disseminated to Delegations is rather limited. Yet it is in the field that coordination 
potentially bears most fruit. 
 
At country level, multi-donor coordination on PSD was found to be quite varied. Marked 
differences exist with respect to the existence and degree of donor coordination and the 
extent of local government involvement. Coordination has mostly been implemented 
through the creation of consultative or working groups (Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco 
and Vietnam). The survey (Annex 5, Section 6) refers rather to overall coordination in the 
sector but results are not clear-cut: 57% of the 14 Delegations that answered this section 
indicate that there is a multi-donor coordination group on private sector development. 
Sometimes coordination is organised only for some aspects of a project, on a case-by-case 
basis rather than being systematically structured in an institutional framework (EJADA 
programme in Jordan). In other cases, coordination also takes the form of ad-hoc multi-
donor review of the programme (SFD programme in Egypt). 
Box 3.2 - Potential for coordination in PSD 
The effectiveness of coordination practices has recently improved. In the past donors did 
not pursue complementarity analysis and policy coordination. Coordination activities were 
often limited to consultation and information and seldom took the form of a policy 
dialogue leading to common decisions. In practice, each donor developed its own PSD 
activities and implemented its own PSD support structure, causing “institutional 
proliferation” rather than “institutional coordination”. This situation made the PSD 
environment even more complex and led to programme overlaps and inefficient use of 
resources. The EC and other donors now give more importance to the coordination 
function. The case of Senegal is an interesting illustration; attempts are being made to 
improve the situation under the new country strategy to promote better coordination so 
as to improve the impact of the interventions and the efficiency of the PSD strategy in the 
country. 
Some insights from the country mission in Vietnam may further explain why donor 
coordination is particularly challenging in the PSD sector while suggesting that higher 
levels of coordination are nevertheless possible. Reasons for lack of effective coordination 
include the fact that coordination is sometimes hampered by national interests which are 
likely to exist in PSD-related issues (e.g. donor visibility or business-to-business 
co-operation between local and national companies). 
In spite of this, there is room for improvement through a thorough analysis of specific 
areas of coordination where conflicts of interest are less present. During the country 
mission, the team identified higher potential for coordination in specific areas of 
intervention (legal and regulatory framework, institutional capacity and policy dialogue) as 
well as in particular areas where the potential for coordination is high, including local 
economic development. Coordination is however more challenging in some areas of 
intervention and particularly at micro-level, for example in business-to-business 
co-operation or BDS services. 
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The role played by the Commission in the coordination process is variable. In some 
cases, the EC takes the initiative and the lead (Dominican Republic, Uganda, Jordan, 
Egypt, Vietnam and Mexico), either because the government does not assume this task or 
because the EC constitutes a reference point for other donor programmes. In other cases 
the EC is less pro-active, its coordination activities being limited to dissemination of 
information and mutual awareness of one another’s activities in the sector (Tunisia, 
Zambia). In such cases other donors may take the lead. Field missions also suggest a 
varying degree of involvement of the partner government in coordinating donor activities 
in PSD. In Morocco, for example, coordination is ensured by the donors themselves. In 
contrast, coordination in Vietnam is managed indirectly by the Agency of Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development (ASMED). In Zambia and Jamaica both coordination 
between donors, and between the donor group and the government, are practised. 
 
In most cases co-operation between donors is absent from PSD project practice. There is 
little evidence of distribution of tasks, joint activities or joint projects. Few projects 
are actually multi-donor; it seems that each donor has its own portfolio of projects to 
finance and manage. In Zambia, only three PSD-related programmes (out of a sample of 
some 23) have been identified as being jointly funded by more than one donor agency. 
None was funded by the EC. A counter-example is the Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
in Vietnam set up by the World Bank and in which the EC participates. Moreover, the 
degree of success of the few multi-donor projects varies from one country to another. For 
instance, the GRATIS project in Ghana and the SFD programme in Egypt were globally 
successful, whereas the micro-finance programme in Uganda preceding the SUFFICE 
project (the Micro-Projects Programme) is considered a failure. 
 
Furthermore, the risk of overlap was found to be high especially for meso- and micro- 
level interventions. While, given the nature of the study, it was difficult for the evaluation 
team to seek detailed information on the beneficiaries of the different programmes funded 
by donors or the partner government, the evidence including interviews revealed a degree 
of overlap (Mexico, Zambia). In Zambia, for example, there are 21 micro-level 
programmes all targeting private sector competitiveness; given the size of the private 
sector in that country, it would be surprising if no overlap existed. A different situation 
seems to exist in Morocco, where several interviewees confirmed there was little overlap 
between donor activities, and similarly in Vietnam, where the ASMED confirmed that 
overlap is rare. 
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3.7 Crosscutting issues 
EVALUATION QUESTION 
EQ 9 TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE EC PSD INTERVENTIONS SHOWED CONCERN FOR 
CROSSCUTTING ISSUES SUCH AS PROMOTING WOMEN-LED ENTERPRISES, ENSURING 
ACCEPTABLE WORKING CONDITIONS NOTABLY FOR WOMEN, PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND PROMOTING BETTER GOVERNANCE PRACTICES? 
SYNTHESIS 
Although most country programming documents explicitly mention cross-cutting issues, 
they do not give directions for systematic integration of these issues into the co-operation 
strategy, in particular the PSD strategy. The evaluators did not encounter any systematic 
attempt at concretely integrating CCIs into EC PSD interventions. Mention of gender and 
environment issues was found in some programme documents but there was no mention 
of the manner in which these crosscutting issues should be treated, and furthermore they 
seldom provided monitoring indicators and baseline information. As for labour conditions 
and good governance, they are hardly ever mentioned and no example of monitoring 
indicators was found among the programmes analysed, except for one case of good 
governance. 
3.7.1 Justification 
Cross-cutting issues are identified by the EC as policy priorities that should be 
mainstreamed into all EC interventions. In such a broad evaluation, assessing the 
effectiveness of the interventions in terms of progress along these lines would be difficult. 
However pinpointing local concerns or, in some cases, evidence of negative impact should 
be possible. Four cross-cutting issues are analysed via this evaluation question: gender; 
environment; social issues such as working conditions or child labour; and good 
governance. 
3.7.2 Analysis 
The field mission confirmed the analysis carried out during the desk phase of the 
evaluation. In summary, although most country programming documents (e.g. NIPs or 
CSPs for Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Vietnam, Ghana, Morocco, Mexico and Jamaica) 
explicitly mention cross-cutting issues, they give no directions for systematic integration of 
these issues into the co-operation strategy or, in particular, into the PSD strategy. The 
evaluators did not find any evidence of systematic attempts to integrate CCI firmly into 
EC PSD interventions. 
 
PSD programme documents make little reference to crosscutting issues and, even when 
they do, few indicators are defined. When mentioned, they refer to gender, environment 
and in one case to good governance. No mention of working conditions was found. There 
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is little evidence to conclude that, even when mentioned, crosscutting issues have actually 
been taken into account in the implementation of the programme. 
3.7.2.1 Gender 
In some cases, country programming documents make reference to the necessity to target 
the needs of women, to enhance their role in economic life and to give them the possibility 
of benefiting from appropriate social support. They advocate female entrepreneurship but 
do not indicate how this might take effect or what kind of actions should be planned. 
Strategy documents remain thus thin on the manner in which this crosscutting issue 
should be treated, noting only that actions can be developed when appropriate and on an 
ad hoc basis. 
 
Reference to the issue of female entrepreneurship in PSD projects is rare. In some cases, 
project documents recognise that an important proportion of small and micro-enterprise 
entrepreneurs are women but, notwithstanding this fact, women are not a specific target of 
the projects (e.g. Dominican Republic). While concern for gender equality is mentioned in 
some project financing agreements, which state that the project management will evaluate 
the gender impact of the project and integrate gender aspects into the different 
components, the documents usually provide no gender indicators. In Mexico, there was an 
attempt to integrate environmental and gender issues into the strategy but there is no sign 
that this rules is effectively applied so far. In Zambia, MSDP’s documents do mention 
 
Box 3.3 - A case of good practice 
As far as ensuring the participation of women into a SME project, the Egyptian Social 
Development Fund (SFD) with its large Small Enterprise Development Organization 
(SEDO, €86 million) component is a positive example. SFD focuses on combating 
poverty and as such was involved in the design of a poverty map that offers a support 
mechanism to identify and target low-income groups, a number of indicators and various 
programmes of assistance and services aimed at low-income groups, in particular female-
headed households. SFD has adopted a policy that emphasises women’s role in the small 
enterprise sector. Its gender strategy to implement this policy has three main components: 
 Developing women’s skills and capabilities; 
 Feminising the culture of entrepreneurship; 
 Establishing a businesswomen network. 
A Women and Development Unit was created in 1998, later changing its name to Gender 
Unit. The SEDO Work Plan 2003 indicates that equal opportunities will be given to 
women to attend training aimed at strengthening skills and capabilities to establish 
successful enterprises. Gender-disaggregated statistics are used by SEDO, distinguishing 
between men and women among the borrowers, and showing that in 1999 the percentage 
of SEDO loan activities to women was as high as 32.3% although no affirmative action 
had been taken in favour of women. With this in view, it is only regrettable that the 
evaluation of SEDO Non-Financial Services undertaken in 2003 did not carry out any 
gender analysis. 
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gender as an issue to be integrated into the programme and indicate that it will be closely 
monitored throughout the project but the logical framework provides no indicators for 
monitoring gender issues (although it does contain monitoring indicators for good 
governance). Again in Zambia, one component of the EDF aims at promoting the 
employment of young women but no monitoring indicators were provided for in the 
logical framework. In Egypt, the financing agreement of the PSDP provided for a number 
of activities to promote the participation of women including encouragement of Business 
Associations to target women’s needs within their sector. However the project’s final 
evaluation report does not mention that any action was taken in that direction. In the 
absence of indicators and when nothing is known about the way in which the gender issue 
has been addressed by the project from its start, the evaluation reports analysed do not 
address the issue. 
3.7.2.2 Environment 
Recent Country Strategies usually make reference to this crosscutting issue and in some 
countries environment has become one of the country priorities (e.g. Dominican 
Republic). In some cases, an Environment Impact Assessment would be undertaken for 
large projects (Jordan). But as for the gender issue, CSPs remain short on the manner in 
which the environment question should be treated, noting that actions related to these 
issues can be developed when appropriate and on an ad hoc basis. 
 
At project document level, some financing agreements or TORs suggest that the project 
will actively support activities aimed at solving environmental problems (Egypt, SFD and 
SEDO), or that they will not support SMEs that act negatively on the environment or do 
not respect national environmental standards (Jordan). One programme envisaged using 
an environmental impact assessment as the basis for selection criteria; however, during 
implementation the issue received little attention (Jamaica’s TDP). Some have an 
“opportunistic” perspective on the environmental issue, recognising its importance as a 
commercial asset to the tourist industry or recognising the adoption of environmental 
standards as a condition for better access to the EU market. Others combine the purpose 
of increased competitiveness of the industry with the principle of sustainable 
environmental management (e.g. woodworking sector development programme in 
Ghana). 
Box 3.4 - A case of good practice 
A specific and positive case is that of Ghana’s woodworking programme. Its overall 
objective is the growth of the country’s export revenue through support of non-traditional 
exports in the woodworking sector, while at the same time ensuring the compatibility of 
these developments with the principles of sustainable forest management. More and more 
companies are realising the need to conserve the tropical forests and avoid wasteful 
depletion of this resource. Companies have been advised on forestry certification and 
certification programmes have been developed. The target is that, by 2004, 250,000 ha will 
be certified as “sustainably managed” by the Forest Stewardship Council, through a higher 
share of lesser-used species in wood processing. 
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The means proposed for reaching entrepreneurs in this regard are incorporation of 
environmental issues into training programmes (Jamaica, Jordan and Ghana) and political 
dialogue (Dominican Republic). Unfortunately, project evaluation reports usually omit the 
subject.  
 
The environment is only starting to be taken into account by PSD programmes in more 
concrete ways. For instance, actions are being implemented to raise the awareness of 
private sector actors of their potential contribution to more sustainable management of 
resources. But follow-up of the activities implemented and results achieved is yet very 
limited. 
3.7.2.3 Social issues 
As far as working conditions, child labour and other social issues are concerned, it appears 
that these issues were not taken into account in PSD programmes. In only one case 
(Tunisia) were security standards to be observed by enterprises raised as an issue in the 
identification and formulation report on an industrial modernisation programme. 
3.7.2.4 Good governance 
No specific reference to this fourth crosscutting issue could be found in the documents 
consulted, with the exception of Zambia’s MSDP where indicators for good governance 
were found. Some recent country programming documents are starting to mention the 
principle of good governance as part of the overall EC co-operation strategy with the 
country (e.g. Ghana, Senegal, Vietnam and Jamaica) but no specific link to the private 
sector is made in spite of the fact that good governance is an integral part of a country’s 
institutional and regulatory framework. Yet a conducive institutional and regulatory 
framework is considered a precondition for PSD and is also the first area of intervention 
proposed by the PSD Guidelines and the COM(2003)267. The fact that good governance 
is not yet taken into account in countries where the Commission funds interventions in 
support of PSD suggests insufficient awareness of the importance of the institutional and 
regulatory aspects of PSD. 
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4. Conclusions 
This section presents the main conclusions derived from the analysis undertaken. First, it 
provides an overall assessment of EC support to private sector development. Second, it 
presents the main conclusions at the level of the overall EC PSD strategy. Finally, it 
presents conclusions regarding the implementation of the strategy. The latter are divided 
into conclusions applying to all areas of intervention and conclusions applying only to 
specific areas of intervention. 
4.1 Overall assessment 
With hindsight, we know that past donor interventions in support of PSD were not 
successful at increasing the competitiveness of beneficiary countries. In brief, many 
programmes were in fact helping governments to crowd out private initiatives, had limited 
impact (particularly in the case of micro-level programmes) and were designed within the 
framework of a single-project-approach which led to tackling of small portions of the 
problem at a time. This was the case with EC interventions as well as with most other 
donors’ interventions. 
 
Benefiting from assessments made at regional or programme level and from international 
discussions such as those carried out in the DAC and SEDONORS, the EC adjusted its 
strategy and proposed in 2003 a single framework for the support of PSD in third 
countries. This strategy reflects a positive and significant effort to adjust EC support 
to PSD to a better understanding of the functioning of the economy and of the role 
of the public sector. It also reflects efforts to provide European PSD support in a 
comprehensive and coherent way to all third countries. It should be noted that the 
publication of the strategy in 2003 is a milestone on a dynamic process started several 
years earlier. Prior documents containing some of the elements of the new strategy are the 
COM(1998)667, covering ACP countries, and the Council Resolution of 1999, which 
made this COM extensive to all developing countries. 
 
The formalisation of a single strategy covering basically all forms of PSD support and for 
all co-operation programmes is therefore an important step forward. Yet, the evaluators 
should point a serious weakness: the strategy is ambiguous in the message it conveys. 
On the one hand, it reflects the evolution of the respective roles of the State and the 
private sector in the economy. For instance, there is recognition that the private sector 
plays a key role in the process of development and that the State should focus on 
regulatory aspects (setting the rules of the game and ensuring they are respected). To be 
coherent, the objective should thus focus on improving the environment in which firms 
operate (from national laws and regulations to the functioning of financial and BDS 
markets). Yet the strategy also leaves room for programmes focused on the provision of 
services. 
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This ambiguity is reflected in the implementation of the strategy. Most EC PSD 
programmes, particularly at meso- and micro-levels, are focused on provision of services, 
directly or through intermediate organisations: provision of a credit line, provision of BDS, 
organisation of business trips, and so on. These services are always provided at subsidised 
rates and in the great majority of cases do not tackle the causes of the malfunctioning of the 
market. In other words, the programme substitutes the private sector instead of trying to 
reinforce the market. In that sense it is possible to say that there is a gap between the 
strategy proposed by HQ and its implementation in the field. 
 
Ye, past assessments have shown that even in cases where such programmes are successful 
at achieving their specific results (providing subsidised services to a given number of 
firms), their contribution to the objective of increasing the competitiveness of the private 
sector is marginal. As shown by the research carried out in the frame of the SEDONORS, 
in the best cases these programmes create islands of excellence without a sustainable impact in 
terms of development of the private sector. In most cases they introduce market 
distortions, unfair competition, can even be subject to corruption and are in most cases 
difficult to manage. 
 
This ambiguity in the message of the strategy is reinforced by the fact that the strategy 
envisages five areas of intervention but gives no guidance on the prioritisation 
among these areas. This lack of guidance possibly reflects a lack of research or the 
absence of a policy decision on how Community support can best be used to help increase 
the competitiveness of third countries. This means that the strategy is too broad, with the 
result that Commission assistance is diffused across many types of programme in different 
areas, with differing foci and differing degrees of success. In consequence, a majority of 
Commission staff responsible for implementing support to PSD lack the necessary 
strategic vision on how to support PSD, the result being uneven implementation in the 
field and only limited contribution to the competitiveness of the private sector in 
beneficiary countries, this being true even of more recent programmes. 
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4.2 Conclusions on the Community’s PSD strategy 
4.2.1 Progress accomplished 
CS-1 Increased awareness of the importance of PSD for third countries 
Since the mid-1980s, the role of the private sector as an essential 
component of the development process has become largely accepted. 
Most third country governments and donor agencies have declared 
their commitment to encourage the development of a healthy and 
dynamic business sector and the redefinition of the role of the State. 
This is for example reflected in the Cotonou Agreement (Article 21). 
The recent creation of the “Business, Trade and Regional Integration 
Unit” in EuropeAid is a further opportunity for the Commission to 
increase the effectiveness of its aid in this area. (Cf. Section 2.2.1) 
CS-2 Elaboration of a single strategy for all third countries 
During the period under evaluation, the formulation of the European 
Commission’s strategy for support of private sector development in 
third countries has been unified between the different regions and 
presented as a comprehensive approach addressing problems at 
different levels, and it reflects, at least partially, the most recent 
debates on the sector. PSD support has a single purpose in all regions, 
supported by a broad range of activities, which can vary from region 
to region. The strategy includes interventions at macro-, meso- and 
micro-levels in five areas of intervention. (Cf. Section 2.2.2) 
CS-3 Creation of an informal Thematic Network 
Reflecting the importance given to PSD support, a thematic network 
was created at HQ level. It functioned as a platform for exchanging 
experience between officials with geographical or horizontal 
responsibilities in the sector. Some of their main outputs include the 
drafting of the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines, as well as the 
creation of a thematic intranet website. This network has worked 
informally and many of its members have recently been transferred to 
the new “Business, Trade and Regional Integration Unit” in the 
Direction “Operation Quality Support” in EuropeAid, showing 
increased awareness of the need for integrating different aspects of 
economic co-operation. (Cf. Section 3.2.2.3) 
The private 
sector is now 
accepted by the 
EC as a 
critical factor 
for poverty 
reduction 
… which is 
reflected by the 
elaboration of 
a recent EC 
PSD strategy, 
… 
… by a lively 
thematic 
network 
functioning at 
HQ level … 
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CS-4 Improved donor coordination 
In spite of the fact that donor coordination is especially challenging in 
the area of PSD support, coordination practices have recently 
improved. Donors, including the EC, have realised that they were 
encouraging proliferation of parallel structures making the business 
environment even more complex and leading to programme overlaps 
and inefficient use of resources. The recent trend in favour of 
interventions at macro- and institutional levels is likely to enhance 
donor coordination further. (Cf. Section 3.6.2) 
4.2.2 Challenges ahead 
CS-5 The EC PSD strategy conveys an ambiguous message 
The strategy reflects, up to a certain point, the recent evolution in 
relation to the respective roles of the State and the private sector in 
the economy. For instance, there is recognition that the State should 
focus on regulatory aspects rather than on the production of goods 
and services. Yet, the strategy also leaves room for programmes 
focused on the provision of services to firms without tackling the 
main causes of the malfunctioning of those markets, and thus 
substituting the private sector (Cf. Section 3.1.2.2). This lack of clarity 
has direct consequences for the way in which the strategy can be 
disseminated, understood and used by staff, as shown below. 
 
CS-6 The strategy does not prioritise among different areas of intervention 
The strategy includes interventions at macro-, meso- and micro-levels 
in five different areas of intervention. Yet there is no prioritisation 
between these areas of intervention and no guidelines or criteria have 
been laid down to help staff select the right area for a given situation. 
As a consequence, in most cases staff decide on the basis of personal 
preferences, past programmes or beneficiaries’ requests. Thus 
concentration on different areas of intervention will not reflect a 
Community approach. Moreover, the lack of prioritisation will 
disperse EC efforts between programmes in different areas, with 
differing foci and degrees of success. 
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CS-7 The EC PSD strategy has not been sufficiently disseminated 
The lack of clarity in the message conveyed by the strategy makes it 
difficult to disseminate to staff. It remains largely unknown to a 
majority of the EC staff in charge of implementing it. This situation 
arises despite efforts made by HQ, for instance through the creation 
of a dedicated intranet website. The evidence shows that the thematic 
website remains underutilised despite the fact that there remains a 
demand for support from HQ (Cf. Section 3.2.2.3 and Annex 5,  
Section 7). 
CS-8 Lack of strategic vision of the staff 
The ambiguous message of the strategy and the consequent difficulty 
of disseminating it among staff has led to a situation in which EC staff 
have different perceptions of what private sector development is, why it is 
important for development and why and how the Community should 
intervene in this area. The contribution of PSD to co-operation and 
development objectives and the specific objective of the strategy are 
unclear to many staff in spite of official declarations and documents. 
Further, in some Delegations there is a sense of a lack of the necessary 
expertise to design a country PSD strategy and to engage on policy 
dialogue with the different stakeholders. Staff in the field are bound to 
rely on personal experience or to follow, uncritically, the requests of 
the beneficiary country. As a consequence, EC PSD interventions 
largely amount to the sum of individual interventions reflecting the 
personal views of staff members or external experts. (Cf. Section 3.1.2) 
CS-9 Uneven implementation of the strategy 
This lack of strategic vision, coupled in some cases with a lack of 
technical expertise, has negatively affected the design of country PSD 
strategies, their implementation and their impact. For instance, in 
several cases the focus has been the direct provision of services 
without due consideration for the limited coverage of the programme 
or its longer term effects. The risk of inducing market distortions 
remains largely disregarded. (Cf. Section 3.1.2) 
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4.3 Conclusions at implementation level 
4.3.1 Across areas of intervention 
CI-1 When programming a country PSD strategy, the absence of a methodical 
process for selecting an area of intervention limits the effectiveness of the 
interventions47 
In a given country, the areas of intervention selected by the EC generally correspond to 
one of the several constraints faced by the private sector in the beneficiary country. 
Moreover, the areas of interventions selected at country level usually correspond to the 
areas designated by the EC PSD strategy. But for a given area of intervention, the degree 
of effectiveness in improving business sector competitiveness will depend on a number of 
factors, including (i) whether the selected area addresses a priority constraint in that 
country, (ii) whether the selected area addresses a constraint in which the EC has 
comparative advantage48, and (iii) whether the pre-conditions for intervention in a given 
area have been met. 
 
The EC does not systematically assess these factors, let alone take them into account when 
selecting its areas of intervention in a given country. Instead, the choice of area is 
frequently based on a demand-driven approach with insufficient critical analysis of the 
pre-conditions or EC comparative advantages and with insufficient consideration of 
interventions in PSD by other donors. As a consequence, the areas of intervention selected 
by the EC in a given country are not always those that ensure the most effective results for 
achieving the purpose. 
CI-2 PSD activities are not designed so as to improve the competitiveness of the 
private sector in a sustainable manner49  
EC PSD programmes frequently attain their specific programme objectives. However, the 
extent to which these programmes improve the competitiveness of the private sector in a 
significant and sustainable way depends on a number of factors. The evaluators concluded 
that PSD activities do not sufficiently take these factors into consideration: 
 
i) Programme objectives are not systematically geared towards achieving the objectives stipulated in the 
EC PSD strategy 
The evaluation confirmed that the objectives stipulated in the EC PSD strategy are 
relevant to improving business sector competitiveness. But they are usually not attained, 
let alone in a sustainable manner, when the specific objectives of PSD programmes are not 
aligned with them. In the area of financial and non-financial services for example, activities 
                                                 
47  Based on Sections 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2., 3.1.2.3, 3.2.2.1. 
48  As discussed in the conclusions per area of intervention below, evidence from the evaluation suggests that the EC 
has a comparative advantage in improving the business environment and a competitive disadvantage in reinforcing 
financial markets. Regarding other areas of intervention, success varies on a case-by-case basis rather than on the 
EC’s comparative advantages. 
49  Based on Sections 3.1.1.2, 3.1.2.3; 3.1.2.1, 3.2.2.3, 3.2.2.5. 
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usually focus on the direct provision of services rather than on reinforcing the structure 
and functioning of the local market. With respect to intermediary organizations, these are 
usually used for the provision of services without direct focus on enhancing their 
institutional capacity.  
 
ii) Key constraints conditioning success are not sufficiently addressed  
Given the transversal character of PSD, an area of intervention may suffer from a number 
of constraints, which often must be addressed jointly in order to reach the expected results 
of the EC PSD strategy. Reinforcing financial markets for example may necessitate 
intervention at macro-level (regulations unconducive to lending operations), meso-level 
(insufficient credit and risk assessment capacity on the part of lenders) and micro-level 
(lack of proper financial reporting on the part of borrowers). Similarly, reinforcing the 
local BDS market requires an approach that addresses both demand- and supply-side 
issues.  
 
The evaluators conclude that the EC does not systematically ensure that key constraints 
within an area of intervention are being addressed, in at least two ways: 
 First, not all constraints are being taken into account when designing a 
programme, either within the programme itself (by making sure that the 
programme targets all key constraints, which requires devoting sufficient financial 
resources to the programme), in coordination with other donors, or in consecutive 
programmes (e.g. Vietnam’s SMEDF I and SMEDF II). Instead, and largely as a 
result of an insufficient diagnosis of the main elements conditioning success in a 
given area, the EC often focuses on responding to just one or a few of the 
constraints within an area of intervention. This implies that while specific project 
objectives may be met, these will be insufficient to ensure that the expected results 
will be attained, as key obstacles conditioning success remain in the way.  
 Second, during programme implementation not all planned components of an 
activity are carried out. This has been observed particularly in interventions in the 
financial sector. Given the importance of tackling all relevant PSD constraints 
within an area of intervention, failure to implement key planned components is 
usually an obstacle to successful attainment of a planned result.  
 
iii) Most meso- and micro-activities lack sufficient outreach and are not targeted on the most adequate 
beneficiaries. 
The achievement of expected results largely depends on the impact of an intervention in 
generating significant changes in the economy, and the latter is partly determined by the 
outreach of the programme as well as by the strategic selection of end-beneficiaries. The 
evaluators first conclude that the outreach of EC interventions at meso- and micro-levels 
is often too limited to ensure a significant impact of the activity on the economy. Lack of 
outreach usually results from insufficient financial resources, either from the EC itself (by 
ensuring that sufficient funds are allocated to the activity) or from other donors (through 
implementation of joint activities). In addition, EC activities are not targeted on the most 
appropriate beneficiaries: programmes frequently target a wide range of beneficiaries in 
different industries instead of focusing on a specific industry or on key players within an 
industry, with higher potential for spill-over in the economy. It must be borne in mind that 
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the debate on selective interventions, including “picking industry winners”, remains 
unsettled in the academic literature, as discussed in the World Development Report 2005.50 
 
iv) Lessons from past activities are not systematically integrated 
The evaluators conclude that as an institution the EC fails to capitalise on its global 
experience in PSD in two ways. First, the monitoring of activities is weak (both on the 
quality of target indicators and on the monitoring of the indicators themselves), which 
limits the scope for lesson learning. Second, there exists no viable mechanism for sharing 
knowledge among staff involved in PSD activities. PSD Guidelines are a good basis but 
are too general to capture insights by type of activity and cannot be updated regularly 
enough to capture recent developments in the various fields. Consequently, sharing of best 
practice and avoidance of repeating undesirable practices occurs only on an ad hoc basis.  
CI-3 There is no systematic attempt either to maximize complementarities between 
areas of intervention or to ensure coherence between PSD and other sectors 
or other EU policies51 
The fact that private sector development is inherently related to the economic, social and 
political development of a beneficiary country highlights the importance of exploiting 
potential complementarities between areas of interventions and maximizing coherence 
between PSD and other sectors of intervention as well as other EU policies. 
 First, complementarities between areas of intervention are seldom exploited. For 
instance, interventions at the meso- and micro-levels seldom complement 
interventions at macro-level to improve, for instance, the regulatory framework of 
those markets. 
 Second, coordination between PSD interventions and interventions in other 
sectors - including trade, regional integration and macroeconomic support - is 
limited. As a consequence there is a risk of incoherence in Community support. 
 Third, the risk of incoherence is even greater with respect to other EU policies. 
Little is done to ensure that EU policies take into account development objectives 
as requested by the Treaty. While PSD documents sometimes highlight 
complementarities and coherence issues, the evaluators conclude that, isolated 
cases apart, there is no systematic effort to maximize potential complementarities 
and coherence, thereby limiting the relevance and effectiveness of these 
interventions. 
                                                 
50  The World Bank (2005), World Development Report, Oxford University Press, page 13. 
51  Based on Sections 3.1.2.2, 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2. 
 
EVALUATION OF EC SUPPORT TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
IN THIRD COUNTRIES ADE 
Final Report – December 2005 page 55 
4.3.2 By area of intervention 
4.3.2.1 Business environment 
CI-4 Many EC business environment programmes have been successful, in large 
part due to their high relevance 
Many EC PSD interventions at macro-level have been successful in improving the 
business environment of partner countries. This is largely the result of the relevance of 
such programmes, in two respects. First, the business environment is a relevant area in 
most countries evaluated, as all have sufficient room for improving the stability of the 
macroeconomic environment as well as the predictability and enforceability of their legal 
and regulatory framework. Second, in terms of programme design most EC programmes 
usually tackled priority constraints of the partner countries. This reflects the expertise, and 
thus comparative advantage of the EC in improving the business environment, particularly 
regarding institutional, legal and administrative reform52. 
CI-5 Yet strong political involvement, a pre-condition for successful implementation 
of business environment programmes, is not systematically taken into account 
A key pre-condition for successful implementation of EC programmes is the involvement 
of the partner government in support for PSD but also its support for EC intervention. 
The necessity of government involvement arises from the fact that it is the public sector 
stakeholders such as policymakers or legislators that are responsible for ensuring the 
implementation of most business environment programmes53. When intervening in the 
business environment, EC programmes do not systematically ensure that there is sufficient 
government involvement. Moreover, lessons from past experience in a country are not 
sufficiently integrated in the design of new programmes aimed at improving the business 
environment54. 
CI-6 Other practices have influenced government involvement 
While the level of government involvement is to a large extent outside the control of the 
EC, several elements were found to have an impact on it. This include minimizing delays 
to ensure that reforms are in line with the government’s own policy agenda55, consultation 
with relevant stakeholders so as to understand local concerns and rally support56, joint 
implementation with other donors so as to increase the weight of proposals,57 and 
                                                 
52  Cf. Desk Phase of the Evaluation of European Community Support to Private Sector Development in Third 
Countries, page 41. 
53  Cf. 3.1.2.2. 
54  Cf. 3.2.2.3. 
55  Cf. Annex 6, EQ 4.1, page 17. 
56  Cf. Annex 5, Section 5.3.1. 
57  Ibid. 
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proposing of reforms at provincial government level which is characterized by a more 
flexible structure which facilitates consensus between the relevant public bodies58. 
CI-7 Support to intermediary organizations has been an effective way of influencing 
government policies 
Support to intermediary organizations (IOs) as an indirect way of influencing policies is 
encouraged in the EC PSD Strategy, as their capacity to carry out a policy dialogue with 
the government is considered key to defining policy priorities and building private sector 
confidence in government action. The evaluation confirms that, when focused on that 
aspect, EC interventions have been successful at improving the representative function of 
the IOs and at increasing their recognition vis-à-vis the government. Success factors 
include: targeting private IOs which have independence from the government and are thus 
better trusted by companies, focusing on building the human capacity of these IOs and 
ensuring that they can generate self-sustaining services to ensure their financial viability. 
Yet, too few interventions of such a type have been implemented so far. 
4.3.2.2 Financial sector 
CI-8 Except for interventions at macro-level, most EC interventions aimed at 
reinforcing financial markets were unsuccessful at addressing the obstacles 
responsible for a lack of access to finance 
At the programme design stage, the components of EC programmes rarely addressed the 
right set of obstacles faced by the financial sector in a given country.59 The lack of 
correspondence between programme components and the real obstacles faced in the 
financial sector is mainly explained by the inadequate EC assessment of the key constraints 
faced by the financial sector60. While some EC programmes were successful in covering 
the key constraints of the financial sector (in particular macro-level interventions such as 
legal and regulatory reform), evaluators conclude that other donors with more experience 
in the financial sector (e.g. EIB or Japan’s JAICA), were consistently better at targeting the 
key obstacles and offered more appropriate solutions to reinforcing the financial sector.  
 
At the implementation stage, planned meso-level components aimed at reform (e.g. 
training), which were necessary to reinforce the financial sector, were rarely implemented. 
In practice, EC programmes mainly focused on the provision of credit lines. The most 
common reasons for the inability to put planned reform components into practice include 
the running out of financial resources, disbursement problems or weak management. That 
said, the fact that it was the reform components that were systematically dropped raises 
additional doubts about the capacity of the EC to implement reform-oriented components 
in the financial sector. 
                                                 
58  Cf. Annex 7, EQ 4.1.3, page 20. 
59  Cf. 3.2.2.3. 
60  Ibid. 
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CI-9 Programmes aimed at financing specific investment projects through direct 
capital contribution have usually been successful in delivering expected outputs 
but unsuccessful with respect of the objectives of the EC PSD strategy 
Many programmes have had an insufficient outreach to or do not target on appropriated 
beneficiaries, thus begging the question as to whether aid resources might have been better 
spent elsewhere61. In addition, and most importantly, many programmes failed to ensure 
high reimbursement rates, which imply two negative consequences of the EC PSD 
strategy. First, because of the high default rate, many who did borrow will find it more 
difficult to borrow in the future, because of their poor credit histories. Second, low 
reimbursement rates raise questions of sustainability of the fund for future lending. The 
experience of low reimbursement rates should not come as a surprise when considering 
that the EC is not adequately equipped to ensure a system of high reimbursement 
compared with donors, such as the EIB, which are more experienced in that area. 
CI-10 PSD Guidelines are not sufficiently clear regarding the role of the EC in 
financial sector interventions 
PSD Guidelines state that, on the one hand, investment financing instruments must be 
implemented either by the EIB or by the EBRD. On the other hand the Guidelines also 
stipulate that it is the Commission’s role to “define the instruments, drawing up overall 
implementation procedures and ensuring consistency with development co-operation 
policy and overall monitoring of the instruments”62. When compared to the first 
statement, this instruction is ambiguous in that it leaves room for questioning the exact 
distribution of activities between the EC and other partner institutions. In addition, in the 
light of the above conclusions, the evaluators doubt whether the Commission is up to the 
tasks described in the second statement. 
4.1.2.3 Business development services 
CI-11 Not all programmes aimed at reinforcing the local BDS market 
The specific objectives of a significant number of EC programmes are not in line with 
those proposed by the Blue Book, to which the EC subscribes. The latter stipulates that 
outreach and sustainability can only be achieved through facilitation of a sustained increase 
in the demand and supply of services, and not through direct provision and subsidies at 
the level of BDS transactions. In contrast, the specific objectives of many EC programmes 
aimed only at the latter. Some EC programmes were successful in that they improved the 
competitiveness of the targeted businesses, but unsurprisingly, no such programme 
succeeded in meeting the principle of outreach and sustainability. While such  
misalignment can be partly explained by the fact that many BDS programmes were 
designed prior to the publication of the Blue Book in 2001 and its adoption by the EC, 
some EC programmes designed after this date continue to aim at the direct delivery of 
BDS. 
                                                 
61  Cf. Annex 6, EQ 4.1, page 18. 
62  PSD Guidelines, page 57. 
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CI-12 The EC strategy is not aligned with the Blue Book BDS paradigm 
The misalignment in objectives between EC programmes and those proposed by the Blue 
Book results partly from the fact that the PSD Guidelines themselves do not completely 
correspond to the Blue Book’s BDS paradigm. While the EC PSD Guidelines highlights 
the importance of reinforcing the local BDS market, it still tolerates the direct delivery of 
services: “individual support projects for BDS can always be implemented in cases where 
it has proved impossible to set up a global programme”63. 
CI-13 EC programme do not adequately address the failures of the BDS market  
Despite the positive evolution towards a greater focus on reinforcing local BDS markets, 
the chosen activities of EC BDS programmes do not always address the BDS constraints 
experienced in a country. Depending of the stage of market development, market failures 
may result from lack of BDS demand or of BDS supply, information failure or low quality 
standards. Moreover, different market failures require different solutions. Presented in the 
order of the market development stages described above, they include respectively: 
sensitisation of a client to the benefits of BDS through the use of business associations, 
facilitation of BDS events and local tendering procedures, bridging the information gap 
through the use of subsidies, and technical assistance to improve quality of services 
supplied. In the case of EC programmes, subsidies remain the favourite mechanism, 
without apparent justification, which helps explain why many programmes are 
unsuccessful in reinforcing the local BDS market. 
CI-14 The EC neither assesses market failures sufficiently, nor devises adequate 
supply-side solutions 
Two reasons help explain the inadequacy of EC solutions to existing market failures. First, 
there is insufficient assessment and thus understanding of the local BDS market and its 
failures, both of which are required procedures laid down in the Blue Book and EC PSD 
Guidelines. As the Blue Book mentions, market assessment aids understanding of the 
reasons behind the lack of demand for or supply of services, and the extent of market 
distortions, as well as helping to identify local mechanisms for service delivery and 
payments. Second, EC programmes have been weaker in devising supply-side solutions to 
respond to supply-side market failures, implying that demand-side solutions, especially 
subsidies, were often chosen by default. In one glaring example, the failure to enhance the 
specialized skills of BDS providers led management to revert back to demand-side 
solutions without attempting to resolve the situation. 
CI-15 Some BDS programmes have successfully achieved their specific objectives, 
conditioned however on the problem of outreach 
Programmes such as Zambia’s PSDP or Morocco’s EME have experienced some success 
in reaching their specific objectives. In addition to having objectives specifically aimed at 
reinforcing BDS markets, and thus in line with the Blue Book, key success factors include 
                                                 
63  Ibid, page 74. 
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in-deep analysis of the failures of local BDS markets and thus the ability to devise adequate 
solutions to overcome them. In the cases mentioned, this implies that the programmes 
simultaneously covered demand and supply-side problems. Additional factors explaining 
the success of these programmes include the flexibility of the programmes to respond 
rapidly to a changing assessment of market failures, and also the joint work between local 
and international consultants which created significant learning benefits for the local BDS 
market. Even so, the small scale of some of these programmes and their subsequent 
limited impact on the economy raises the question of whether the return on investment 
was adequate. 
4.3.2.4 Investment and inter-business co-operation promotion 
CI-16 Partnership interventions have been effective under regional and national 
programmes 
Most EC interventions in the form of partnership have been carried out in the framework 
of regional programmes such as Asia-Invest, AL-Invest, and Pro-Invest. In most cases, 
these programmes have been effective in organizing partnership activities but less often in 
following-up the agreements reached as a result of a partnership activity. Despite the 
limited information on the results of national programmes, it can be stated that many have 
successfully resulted in concrete transactions. Key success factors included the 
effectiveness of local offices, the quality of the events organized and the appropriate 
targeting of the companies invited. 
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5. Recommendations 
This section presents recommendations at two levels. First, it presents recommendations 
regarding the strategy, based on Section 4.2 above. This first set of recommendations 
reflects the main conclusion of this evaluation, namely that the EC PSD strategy is not 
sufficiently clear in the message it conveys, which has direct effects on the design and 
implementation of country PSD strategies and thus on the effectiveness of the support 
provided. Second, detailed recommendations regarding the implementation of EC support 
to PSD are presented, based on Section 4.1 above. They reflect the conclusions reached 
regarding past and current implementation of PSD programmes in different areas of 
intervention. 
5.1 Recommendations on the Community’s PSD strategy 
RS-1 Clarify the message conveyed by the strategy64 
As mentioned above, the main weakness of the EC PSD strategy is that it is not 
sufficiently clear on the role that the EC, as development agency, should play in 
terms of private sector development. This lack of clarity is probably explained by 
historical reasons: first, the paradigm of the role of the State in the economy has changed 
in recent decades and, second, the EC has traditionally been more involved in social 
sectors. Yet, this lack of clarity has direct effects on the effectiveness of aid and therefore 
should be avoided. An update of the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines to provide greater 
clarity on why and, particularly, how the EC can and should support private sector 
development with a view to contributing to wider development and co-operation 
objectives, would greatly improve the effectiveness of EC PSD support. The updated 
documents should include a clear and sufficiently detailed explanation on the links 
between private sector development, economic growth, development objectives and, most 
of all, poverty reduction. 
RS-2 Prioritise the various areas of intervention65 
The strategy is comprehensive in that it covers much of what is a considered to be the 
elements affecting private sector development. However, for this very reason it is too open 
and leads to a dispersion of effort. The EC should identify the areas in which Community 
support can better contribute to the development of the private sector. The elements to 
consider, as in other sectors, are: the size of Community support, its potential to influence 
government decisions which smaller donors lack, and its organisational structure and 
experience. 
 
                                                 
64  Cf. Section 4.1.2.2 – CI-10, Section 4.1.2.3 – CI-12, Section 4.2.2 – CS-1, CS-2, CS-5, CS-9. 
65  Cf. Section 4.1.1 – CI-1, Section 4.2.2 –CS-6, CS-9. 
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The evaluation has shown that the EC has a higher comparative advantage in macro- and 
institutional interventions and a lower one in interventions in financial markets. 
Interventions at macro-level fit particularly well with the experience of the Community 
and, more important, are interventions that have a large multiplier effect. The overall 
impact of the interventions at the macro- and institutional levels are probably higher that 
in any other area of intervention. Moreover, the EC can claim the political and moral 
authority to discuss policy matters with partner countries. Therefore, priority should be 
given to interventions at macro-level. Interventions at micro-level (for instance, to enhance 
firms’ access to BDS) should be understood only as complementary and only when the 
business environment is considered adequate. More important, these interventions should 
aim at reinforcing the local markets and not at providing the service. As explained above, 
in many cases these interventions introduce market distortions, unfair competition, can be 
subject to corruption and are difficult to manage. Finally, low priority should be given to 
intervention in financial markets. 
 
By the same token, the strategy should provide guidance on what kind of support to 
provide in different cases. A typical case is government commitment and there the 
question is whether it is worth supporting PSD in a country where the government is not 
sufficiently committed to PSD. In many cases, a decision has been taken to ignore this fact 
and opt for interventions targeting directly private companies. A different option, in line 
with a sectoral approach as proposed by the EC, is to engage in a policy dialogue with the 
government while at the same time supporting intermediate organisations in their capacity 
to represent the interests of the private sector. 
RS-3 Increase ownership with a view to reaching a unique and common 
Community vision on PSD support66 
Because the strategy is not clear enough and because it has been insufficiently 
disseminated, there is no single vision of Community support to private sector 
development. Yet, without a common EC vision, staff will not be able to apply a strategy. 
A uniform and coherent understanding of EC PSD support is needed to make 
Community support to PSD more than the sum of individual interventions 
reflecting the personal views of the staff or external experts. 
 
Further, the process of creating this common understanding is vital to enhancing ownership. 
It should include the participation of all staff involved in PSD at HQ and in Delegations. 
This certainly does not imply incorporating different views. On the contrary, as mentioned 
in RS-1, the message should be clear, coherent and unambiguous; trying to incorporate 
many different views will blur the picture. In addition, as the Commission currently relies 
on contractual personnel to manage and sometimes design programmes, they should also 
participate in the process as they play an important part in the implementation of the 
strategy in the field. 
 
                                                 
66  Cf. Section 4.2.2 – CS-8, CS-9. 
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The updated strategy should be disseminated widely by using all available channels: 
training, re-vamped website, newsletters, etc. Training could be provided to disseminate it 
further. Mixing staff from different countries and if possible from different regions can 
only enhance the exchange of information and the creation of a network. The 
dissemination and training can be ensured by the network as proposed in RS-5 
RS-4 When updating the COM(2003)267 and the Guidelines keep in mind 
their different functions67 
While a Communication should define theoretical aspects and give policy orientation, the 
Guidelines should be seen as operational support. The Guidelines should provide detailed 
but well structured and unambiguous orientation for implementation, including examples 
of different types of intervention. Both documents should be coherent and cross-
referenced. For instance, using different terminology for the same concept  –  as is the 
case now  -  should be avoided. 
 Both documents should emphasis the importance of carrying out a detailed 
analysis of the situation before deciding how and where to intervene. Further, the 
Guidelines should provide assessment tools. It should be noted that many 
different diagnosis tools for private sector development are currently available; the 
Commission does not need to develop new ones but needs to decide which ones 
to use. 
 Although it is not PSD-specific, both documents should also insist on the 
importance of monitoring and evaluation. It should be clearly explained why 
Results-Oriented Monitoring is important and what it implies when monitoring is 
limited to outputs. Examples of good and bad practice from PSD programmes 
should be provided. The particular difficulties inherent in tracking the effects of 
PSD programmes should be discussed while insisting that it should nevertheless be 
done as, if it is not done, a serious accountability problem arises. 
 Needless to say, the form should also be taken into account, particularly in the case 
of the Guidelines: an attractive and user-friendly document has more chance of 
being used by the staff. To this end, inspiration can be sought from Guidelines 
produced by the Commission for other sectors of co-operation. 
RS-5 Build on the Thematic Network68 
As mentioned throughout the report, aid effectiveness in the sector can be increased 
through sharing of experience acquired by the different actors of EC PSD support and 
from all third countries; through harmonisation of the approaches of the different 
geographical regions – which to a large measure has already been achieved; and through 
better coordination between horizontal, national and regional programmes. This increased 
exchange of information can be achieved through the systematic use of a thematic 
network. 
 
                                                 
67  Cf. Section 4.1.1 – CI-1, CI-2, Section 4.2.2 – CS-2, CS-5, CS-8. 
68  Cf. Section 4.1.1 – CI-2, Section 4.2.2 – CS-3, CS-7, CS-8. 
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The Thematic Network already exists and, although informally set up, has been very active 
in Brussels. A next step should be to promote it actively in the Delegations. There is a 
strong demand from the Delegations, particularly in the context of deconcentration, to 
receive technical support from HQ. The Network should also have support from stable 
external expertise in Brussels and from correspondents in the field who will work hand in 
hand with Delegation staff. Such specialised networking will allow a combination of the 
advantages of the horizontal programmes with those of national programmes: the 
correspondents in the field provide a strong link to the specific realities of each country 
and an opportunity to share this country-specific information. The network in Brussels 
allows capitalising and building of knowledge at central level (for instance through specific 
studies) as well as centralising and disseminating experiences from different countries. 
Ideally, the network should integrate support to trade and regional integration and be 
closely coordinated with macroeconomic support. 
5.2 Recommendations at implementation level 
5.2.1 Across areas of intervention 
RI-1 Adopt a methodical procedure for selecting areas of intervention in a country 
Despite the fact that there exists no one-size-fits-all approach to interventions in PSD, the 
following steps should be systematically adopted when selecting the area or areas of 
intervention in a partner country: 
 
Step 1 Critically assess the priority areas of intervention so as to avoid a purely 
demand-driven approach vis-à-vis the partner country. Such assessment should 
be performed on the basis of internal resources (including EC PSD staff, 
identification missions, and EC PSD experience in other countries via the PSD 
network) and complemented by other donors’ analyses. 
 
Step 2 Select an area of intervention in which the EC has a comparative advantage. 
For example, intervention in the business environment should be encouraged 
while intervention in financial markets should be avoided. If the priority areas 
of a country are those in which the EC has no visible comparative advantage, 
two options are available. First, the EC can still intervene in the priority area 
but in coordination with more experienced donors. Alternatively, the EC can 
focus on non-priority areas of intervention that are nevertheless relevant and in 
which the EC has more experience, as long as the countries’ priority areas are 
already being tackled by other donors. 
 
Step 3 Assess whether the pre-conditions for intervening in a given area are met. For 
instance when deciding to improve the business environment of a partner 
country, sufficient government commitment is a critical pre-condition. 
Evidence from past experience (both the EC’s and other donors’) in that 
country provides a good basis for making such an assessment. 
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RI-2 Design PSD programmes with a view to improving business sector 
competitiveness in a sustainable manner 
Align programme objectives with those stipulated in the EC PSD strategy 
Particularly in the areas of financial and non-financial services, the specific objectives of 
the programme should be to reinforce the structures and functioning of the local market. 
In contrast, programmes aimed at direct delivery of services should be avoided, in view of 
their limited outreach and effectiveness.    
 
Address the key constraints conditioning success in the areas of intervention 
Step 1 Critically assess the key constraints in an area of intervention and include such 
assessments in programming documents. For instance in the area of BDS, 
programming documents should elaborate on the stage of BDS market 
development and where market failures have occurred. In the provision of 
financial services EC programmes must have a clear position on whether the 
lack of access to finance is caused by laws that discourage lending to 
enterprises, by untrained lenders, by insufficient financial resources or by 
inadequate financial reporting by borrowers. 
 
Step 2 Ensure that all key constraints are addressed during the intervention, either by 
the EC itself or in coordination with other donors. If the EC is intervening on 
its own, then it must ensure that sufficient resources are allocated for the 
programme. Given budget constraints, the latter may require concentrating 
resources in fewer areas of intervention in a given programming cycle. 
Alternatively, the EC could explore the possibilities for joint implementation 
with other donors so as to ensure the comprehensiveness of the programmes. 
In any event, programmes that tackle only a fraction of the constraints should 
be avoided. 
 
Step 3 Integrate lessons from the past. First, promote knowledge-building through 
reinforcing the internal monitoring system. Second, use the PSD network to 
exchange information on best and worst practices. 
RI-3 Maximize complementarities between areas of intervention, as well as 
coherence between PSD interventions, interventions in other sectors and other 
EU policies 
Coherence between PSD and other sectors of intervention 
PSD programmes could be accommodated into regional integration programmes, for 
instance by designing BDS components aimed at taking advantage of the opportunities 
offered by regional market integration as well as countering the detrimental effects of  
such integration. Such coherence should be similarly sought with respect to other sectors 
such as trade and macroeconomic support.  
 
Coherence between PSD and other EU policies 
First, pro-active dialogue should be promoted with EC staff responsible for non-PSD 
policies (e.g. by inviting them to join the PSD network) to ensure that the latter take into 
account the impact of their policies on third countries’ private sectors. In addition, EC 
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PSD programmes should be accommodated by other EU policies: BDS activities for 
example should be designed with a view to increasing market access in European markets 
(e.g. trade regulations). 
5.2.2 By area of intervention 
5.2.2.1 Business environment 
RI-4 Intervention in the business environment should be encouraged, as long as 
there is sufficient government commitment 
Step 1 Based on past EC and non-EC experience in the country, assess the level of 
government commitment to implementing EC reforms.  
 
Step 2 Maximize government commitment by: 
− ensuring that reforms are in line with the government’s own policy agenda; 
this can be facilitated by designing business environment programmes 
sufficiently flexibly so that in the event of implementation delays, 
programme components can be adjusted to fit with the government’s 
evolving policy agenda; 
− consulting with relevant stakeholders and ensuring that their views are 
integrated during the design of the programme;  
− exploring coordination with other donors in the form of budget support or 
joint programmes so as to increase the weight of the proposed reform;  
− proposing reforms at provincial level, mainly where the political structure 
at central level appears too rigid. 
 
When government commitment is judged to be insufficient, two lines of action should be 
considered. First, EC intervention at meso- and micro-levels can be undertaken, but only 
with a view to demonstrating to government of the benefits of the private sector. Under 
those circumstances, meso- and micro-interventions should occur within a limited period 
of time. Second, EU interventions should entail constructive dialogue with government 
authorities with a view to changing the latter’s position on the private sector, either directly 
or indirectly through business intermediary organizations.  
RI-5 Encourage support to intermediary organizations as a way of influencing 
private sector policies 
The following best-practices must be kept in mind:  
 Target IOs with sufficient independence from the government so as to earn the 
trust and participation of companies. 
 Focus on building up the human capacity of these IOs to ensure sustainability. 
 Ensure that the targeted IOs can generate self-sustaining services and thus 
financial viability once the programme is complete.  
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5.2.2.2 Financial services: 
RI-6 Avoid meso- and micro-level interventions aimed at intervening in financial 
markets, unless in co-operation with other financial institutions 
With regards to micro-level interventions, the EC should avoid programmes aimed just at 
the provision of credit lines. In addition, if the EC decides to intervene in reinforcing the 
financial markets, it should outsource all the technical aspects of the programme, including 
constraints identification, design of solutions and the drawing up of implementation 
procedures. These roles should be assumed by the EIB or EBRD (as stipulated by the 
PSD Guidelines). This recommendation also applies to meso-level interventions,69 for 
which the EC has not proved to be successful when intervening on its own. However this 
recommendation does not apply to macro-level interventions such as reforms of laws and 
regulations aimed at improving development of the financial sector, in which the EC 
should continue intervening as appropriate. 
RI-7 PSD Guidelines should leave no ambiguity regarding the role of the EC in 
financial sector interventions 
The PSD Guidelines should reconcile their instruction that “investment financing 
instruments must be implemented either by the EIB or by the EBRD” with the stipulation 
that it is the Commission’s role to “define the instruments, drawing up overall 
implementation procedures and ensuring consistency with development co-operation 
policy and overall monitoring of the instruments”. The evaluators recommend 
reformulation of the PSD Guidelines on the basis of the preceding conclusion, which state 
that the role of the EC in the technical aspects of financial sector intervention should be 
minimized. This minimised role in the financial sector only applies to micro- and meso-
level interventions, and not to interventions at macro-level.  
5.2.2.3 Business development services 
RI-8 BDS programmes and the EC PSD Strategy should aim only at reinforcing 
local BDS markets, not at the direct delivery of services 
To align the EC PSD strategy with the Guidelines proposed by the Blue Book, the PSD 
Guidelines should discourage interventions aimed at the direct delivery of services by 
removing statements such as “individual support projects for BDS can always be 
implemented”. Instead, it should only encourage programmes aimed at reinforcing the 
local BDS market. In the same spirit, the objectives of BDS programmes should also be 
geared to reinforcing the local BDS market. 
                                                 
69  Examples of meso components include the provision of training to lenders to assess risk and/or to introduce new 
ways of accepting collaterals or setting up institutions aimed at improving the capacity of borrowers to provide 
adequate financial information to lenders. 
 
EVALUATION OF EC SUPPORT TO PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
IN THIRD COUNTRIES ADE 
Final Report – December 2005 page 68 
RI-9 BDS programmes should address prevailing BDS market failures rather than 
advocate demand-led subsidies by default 
Step 1 During the identification phase, critically assess the local BDS market and the 
precise nature of market failures. In so doing, past EC and non-EC experience 
in BDS intervention should be taken into account.  
 
Step 2 During programme design, supply-side measures should be used when 
necessary. To compensate for the limited EC expertise in supply-side solutions, 
programme designers should make use of all available EC expertise in other 
countries through exchanges of knowledge via the PSD network, as well as 
being informed by other donors’ supply-side measures.  
 
Step 3 Programmes should be designed flexibly, in case programme managers 
discover new market failures and need to adjust their approaches.   
 
Step 4 Find a right balance between international and local consultants, so as to 
balance the benefits of learning versus those of sustainability.  
 
Step 5 In terms of scale of the programme, those that will have only limited impact on 
the economy should be avoided. 
